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CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT BY PROXY 
John F. Preis∗ 
MERICANS love their Constitution. But love, as we all know, 
is blind. This may explain why we often look to constitutional 
law to vindicate our civil rights while ignoring the potential of sub-
constitutional law. Federal courts have not ignored this possibility, 
however, and have increasingly forced civil rights plaintiffs to seek 
relief using sub-constitutional law where it is available. A victim of 
discrimination, for example, might be denied the chance to invoke 
the Equal Protection Clause and told instead to rely on a federal 
antidiscrimination statute. In this and other cases, courts seem to be-
lieve that constitutional rights can be enforced through the applica-
tion of sub-constitutional law, a practice this Article refers to as 
“constitutional enforcement by proxy.” 
 A
This Article is the first to analyze the emerging practice of proxy 
enforcement. This issue is important because it lies at the confluence 
of several important discourses in the federal courts field—such as 
the judicial duty to issue a remedy for every constitutional wrong, 
the role of non-Article III actors in setting constitutional norms, and 
the degree to which sub-constitutional law can, like the Constitution 
itself, be “constitutive” of the national order. This Article’s central 
claim is that proxy enforcement, properly administered, is permissi-
ble and even advisable in a large number of cases. It is permissible 
because federal courts’ duty to supervise the behavior of non-Article 
III actors does not require courts to invoke the Constitution directly 
(unless Congress has ordered otherwise). If courts can maintain 
constitutional norms using sub-constitutional law, they are entirely 
free to do so. 
The practice is normatively attractive because it promises a partial 
truce in the everlasting debate over interpretive supremacy. By rely-
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. For their thoughts on 
this Article, I thank Chris Cotropia, Jessica Erickson, Barry Friedman, Jim Gibson, 
Corinna Lain, Jason Mazzone, Alan Morrison, Lou Mulligan, Jim Pfander, Ben 
Spencer, and Howard Wasserman, as well as participants in American University’s 
2008 Conference on Judges and Judging and the Fall 2008 Virginia Junior Faculty Fo-
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ing on sub-constitutional law to enforce the Constitution, federal 
courts allow non-Article III actors a significant role in the articula-
tion of constitutional norms, a role normally denied them when 
courts enforce the Constitution directly. Thus, sub-constitutional ad-
judication of civil rights claims does not spurn our love of the Con-
stitution; it preserves individual rights while honoring a principle 
that lies at the Constitution’s very heart: popular sovereignty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Americans love their Constitution. A typical visit to Washing-
ton, D.C., might involve a trip to the National Air and Space Mu-
seum, a tour of the monuments on an amphibious bus, and quite 
strangely, veneration of a legal document. That’s right. Americans 
will stand in a long, snaking line outside the National Archives just 
to see, for a brief moment, written law. The Constitution is main-
tained at the Archives in a way that would make the Second Re-
statement of Agency positively jealous. Encased in a brass cabinet 
with a glass top, the document sits upon an altar that is framed by 
marble columns, high ceilings, and opulent draperies. The atmos-
phere is overtly religious, as though the Ark of the Covenant were 
on display.1 
Given this solemn reverence of the Constitution, it should not be 
surprising that constitutional adjudication is also treasured.2 The 
American civil rights action is widely regarded as the premier tool 
of social justice. It is how starving prisoners obtain food, women 
fight stereotypes, and black schoolchildren obtain a meaningful 
education.3 Although these successes, like the opulent draperies, 
inspire our admiration, they also obscure a fundamental truth: the 
Constitution is, at its core, simply a set of laws. The laws tell gov-
ernment actors how they must behave and in this respect are no 
different from a great many other laws. Landmark civil rights stat-
utes, for example, prohibit intentional discrimination just as the 
1 The Constitution has long been described in quasi-religious terms. See, e.g., Bailey 
v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) (referring to the Constitution as “the 
ark of our covenant”). For other commentary on this conception of the Constitution, 
see Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988); Edward S. Corwin, The Worship 
of the Constitution, 4 Const. Rev. 3 (1920), reprinted in 1 Corwin on the Constitution 
47–55 (Richard Loss ed., 1981); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1984) (calling the Constitution “a sacred symbol, the most potent 
emblem (along with the flag) of the nation itself”). 
2 See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Domain of Norma-
tive Theory, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 523, 531 (2000) (“Constitutional adjudication is at-
tached firmly in our minds to a conception of the constitution as grand law . . . .”). 
3 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (holding prison’s failure to feed prisoners 
adequately a violation of the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515 (1996) (holding public university’s refusal to admit women a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding school 
district’s use of separate schools for African-Americans a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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Equal Protection Clause does.4 Even the common law of battery—
law that has no prayer of ever appearing on an altar in the National 
Archives—can often do the work of the Fourth Amendment in ex-
cessive-force cases.5 Thus, one aggrieved by government actions 
need not always rely on the ultimate law of government. 
But what if a plaintiff, fresh off a trip to the Archives, preferred 
to invoke the Constitution rather than some sub-constitutional 
law? With increasing regularity, plaintiffs have been denied this 
opportunity. Take, for example, Correctional Services Corp. v. 
Malesko.6 The plaintiff there suffered a heart attack while in prison 
and brought a civil rights action against the prison, alleging a viola-
tion of his Eighth Amendment rights. The Court never reached the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim because he “enjoy[ed] a parallel tort 
remedy” for medical negligence.7 Or take Wilson v. Libby, in which 
Valerie Plame sought relief from the Vice President and his top as-
sistants for disclosing her status as a covert CIA operative.8 The 
D.C. Circuit recently held that Plame’s constitutional claims were 
barred because a federal statute, the Privacy Act, prohibited the 
disclosure of Plame’s identity and provided her with at least some 
relief.9 These and other cases10 suggest that where sub-
constitutional law is available for relief, the Constitution is un-
available. The Constitution, in other words, can be enforced by 
proxy. 
The emerging practice of proxy enforcement in constitutional 
adjudication has yet to command much attention from the legal 
academy. This is surprising because the practice sits at the conflu-
ence of several important discourses in the federal courts field. 
Scholars and jurists have long debated the duty of federal courts to 
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) (imposing liability on state agencies, counties, and mu-
nicipalities for intentional discrimination in employment); Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (stating that states will be liable under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for intentional racial discrimination in employment). 
5  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that the use of force during 
an arrest will violate the Fourth Amendment where such use is not “objectively rea-
sonable”); Lewis v. Goodie, 798 F. Supp. 382, 390 (W.D. La. 1992) (holding police of-
ficer liable for common law battery for use of force during arrest). 
6 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
7 Id. at 72–73. 
8 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
9 Id. at 709. 
10 See infra Section I.B. 
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issue a remedy for every constitutional wrong,11 the role of non-
Article III actors in setting constitutional norms,12 and the degree 
to which sub-constitutional law, like the Constitution itself, is “con-
stitutive” of the national order.13 When the federal courts engage in 
proxy enforcement, they withhold constitutional remedies and rely 
on sub-constitutional law, thus giving non-Article III actors a more 
significant role in crafting constitutional norms. A comprehensive 
assessment of the modern practice—which is offered for the first 
time in this Article—will thus speak to many audiences and, of 
course, invite many responses as well. 
This Article’s central claim is that proxy enforcement, properly 
administered, is permissible and even advisable in a large number 
of cases. The permissibility of the practice turns chiefly on two 
conditions: whether Congress has forbidden the practice, and 
whether the sub-constitutional law can adequately enforce the con-
stitutional interests at stake. If Congress has not instructed the fed-
eral courts otherwise, there is nothing to prevent courts from 
choosing sub-constitutional law to achieve constitutionally re-
quired ends. The Constitution does not mandate that the federal 
11 See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 289 (1995) (arguing that judicial remedies for constitutional wrongs are 
compelled); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the 
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 Hastings L.J. 665 (1987) (arguing the 
same); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 
861–62 (2004) (arguing that federal courts do not have a duty to remedy every 
wrong); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1789 (1991) (arguing that judicial 
refusal of remedies for constitutional violations in some instances is “regrettable, but 
tolerable”). 
12 For scholarship criticizing the exclusion of non-Article III actors from the process 
of constitutional interpretation, see Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popu-
lar Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Consti-
tution Away from the Courts (1999); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative 
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943 (2003). For scholarship defending judicial 
supremacy in constitutional interpretation, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 Const. Comment. 455, 457–58 (2000); 
Daniel A. Farber, The Importance of Being Final, 20 Const. Comment. 359 (2003); 
Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1594, 1629–35 (2005) (book review). 
13 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 
1216–17 (2001); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 
Yale L.J. 408, 424–25 (2007). 
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courts issue a constitutional remedy for every constitutional wrong; 
it simply requires the courts to “keep government, overall and on 
average, tolerably within the bounds of law.”14 If sub-constitutional 
law can accomplish this end, then courts are free to use it. 
Moreover—and more controversially—federal courts are free to 
rely on sub-constitutional laws even if the laws provide rights that 
are narrower than constitutional rights, or remedies that are weaker 
than constitutional remedies. Proxy enforcement is permissible in 
such instances because a large number of what we define as consti-
tutional rights are not actually required by the Constitution, but 
rather judicially crafted rules designed to implement underlying 
constitutional norms. Such rules are born from the collision of con-
stitutional ambiguity and necessity. The Constitution only vaguely 
suggests limits on justiciability, for example, but the Court must de-
sign rules to limit its jurisdiction, or else every policy question be-
fore Congress will be converted into a lawsuit—a result plainly at 
odds with the constitutional design.15 Though the judiciary must de-
sign such rules, it necessarily has discretion in defining the rules’ 
exact contours. Given this discretion, there is nothing to prevent 
the judiciary from choosing rules devised by Congress or the states 
that vary from judicially devised rules. 
Even if courts are free to enforce the Constitution by proxy, why 
should they? The chief value of the practice lies in its promise of a 
partial truce in the everlasting debate over interpretive supremacy. 
Modern constitutional law and scholarship is infatuated with a sin-
gle, seemingly insoluble question: who controls the meaning of the 
Constitution?16 On one side are those who, remembering victory in 
Brown, claim that federal courts must retain interpretive suprem-
acy so that core constitutional values can be protected from majori-
tarian passions. On the other side are those who, remembering de-
feat in Lochner, claim that federal courts must yield to the 
interpretive choices of political branches so that majority prefer-
14 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 311 (1993). 
15 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Mean-
ing, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1274, 1280–97 (2006) (discussing the political question doctrine 
in light of the need for enforcement of constitutional norms). 
16 Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002) (tracing the history of 
this debate). 
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ences will be realized. The practice of enforcement by proxy holds 
great promise as a mediating force in the inter-branch and inter-
governmental struggle over interpretive supremacy. The practice 
allows the judiciary to retain its power to check abuses by non-
Article III actors and, at the same time, allows these same entities 
a role in particularizing the norms of acceptable government be-
havior. 
Some might find the practice of proxy enforcement undesirable 
because it will stymie the development of constitutional law, 
squelch public debate on constitutional issues, and be difficult to 
administer. These claims mostly fail because proxy enforcement 
will not significantly decrease the quantity or nature of constitu-
tional litigation, thus leaving ample opportunities for constitutional 
development and debate. The practice will prove difficult, how-
ever, where state law is the putative stand-in for the Constitution. 
State laws emanate from legislative, executive, and judicial bodies 
at the municipal, county, and state-wide level throughout all fifty 
states. The sheer volume and heterogeneity of these laws will pre-
vent the development of broadly applicable precedent to guide 
courts in future cases, thus requiring courts to analyze each case 
anew. This problem does not apply where a federal statute or regu-
lation is the putative stand-in because those laws emanate from a 
far more limited number of sources and apply uniformly through-
out the nation. Thus, from a normative perspective, proxy en-
forcement should be practiced using federal, but not state, law. 
In the final analysis, Constitution worshipers—whether at the 
Archives, in court, or part of the legal academy—should be pleased 
with the prospect of constitutional enforcement by proxy. Instead 
of dishonoring the Bill of Rights by invoking sub-constitutional 
law, the practice honors a right that lies beneath and before every 
other right: the right of self-rule. Whatever else it may say, the 
Constitution makes clear that the ultimate sovereign is always “the 
people themselves.”17 Enforcing the Constitution by proxy affirms 
our popular sovereignty without dispensing with our individual 
rights—a difficult feat that should impress us all. 
17 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in Writings 123, 274 (Merrill D. 
Peterson ed., 1984) (“Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the 
people alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories.”). 
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I. THE SHIFT FROM DIRECT TOWARDS PROXY ENFORCEMENT 
In the United States, law is everywhere. All three branches of 
the federal government create law, as do all branches of the fifty 
state governments and countless subordinate governments. The re-
sulting multiplicity of laws makes it almost inevitable that some ac-
tions will violate multiple laws. When behavior violates the Consti-
tution as well as sub-constitutional law, which law should apply? 
Section I.A below explains that sub-constitutional law has tradi-
tionally been irrelevant to the availability of a civil rights action 
and attributes this practice to historic presumptions about state 
courts, state law, and congressional preferences. Section I.B then 
describes changes in these presumptions and identifies areas of law 
where proxy enforcement has grown in use. This Section does not 
posit that proxy enforcement has taken hold in the federal courts, 
for it has not. Rather, it only posits that the ideological roadblocks 
that historically prevented proxy enforcement have largely disap-
peared and that the practice has begun to emerge as an alternative 
method of constitutional enforcement. 
A. Direct Enforcement 
In the United States, a person may enforce her constitutional 
rights by suing the officer responsible for the deprivation. The ex-
act cause of action available to the plaintiff will depend on the 
identity of the officer. Where the officer acts under color of state 
law, the plaintiff must bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.18 Where 
the officer acts under color of federal law, the plaintiff must bring a 
“Bivens action”—so-called because the action was first recognized 
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics.19 Bivens actions are creatures of judicial creation and 
thus are more flexibly applied than Section 1983 actions.20 In the 
modern civil rights era, the traditional rule in Section 1983 and 
Bivens cases has been that constitutional rights may be enforced 
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
19 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
20 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (stating that, in determining whether 
to recognize a Bivens action, “the federal courts must make the kind of remedial de-
termination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal”) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 
462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). 
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without regard to whether sub-constitutional law might also pro-
vide relief. 
Monroe v. Pape nicely illustrates this practice in the Section 1983 
setting.21 In Monroe, James Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago 
police officers had, without a warrant or other authority, raided his 
house in the early morning, made his family stand naked in the liv-
ing room, and later held him at the police station for ten hours 
without charges or access to an attorney. Monroe brought a civil 
rights action under Section 1983. At issue in the case was whether 
the officers acted under color of state law, even though they had no 
explicit authority or order to act as they did. Seeking to escape li-
ability under Section 1983, the officers argued that Monroe’s true 
remedy was under state tort law, not the Federal Constitution. Re-
jecting this argument, the Court explained: 
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would 
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state rem-
edy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the 
federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its consti-
tution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is 
no barrier to the present suit in the federal court.22 
Thus, plaintiffs intent on vindicating their constitutional rights 
against state officers did not have to resort to sub-constitutional 
law first, jointly, or even at all.23 Put differently, a constitutional 
right was a freestanding right; it was susceptible to judicial en-
forcement without regard to which other rights may have been vio-
lated. 
21 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
22 Id. at 183 (emphasis added). 
23 Though this principle is most often tied to Monroe, it actually predates Monroe 
and extends beyond the § 1983 context. For example, in the landmark case Home 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), the Court 
held that “conduct of state officials that, prima facie, contravened the [U.S. Constitu-
tion] is open to challenge in the district courts without regard to whether that conduct 
also violates state law or whether the state provides adequate corrective process.” 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, State Law Wrongs, State Remedies, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 979, 981 (1986); see also Michael Wells, 
“Available State Remedies” and the Fourteenth Amendment: Comments on Florida 
Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1665, 1667 (2000) (“A central 
principle of constitutional law, established in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles, is that the constitutional violation is complete when officials act, 
even if their conduct is not authorized by state law.”) (footnote omitted). 
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Underlying the Court’s decision in Monroe was the belief that 
state courts could not be trusted to enforce civil rights. Requiring 
civil rights plaintiffs to plead state law claims would typically force 
the plaintiffs into state court,24 and state courts, in the opinion of 
the Court at least, were possessed of “prejudice, passion, neglect, 
[and] intolerance.”25 Thus, to allow plaintiffs to escape this preju-
dice and take advantage of federal courts’ supposed solicitude for 
federal rights, plaintiffs must be permitted to plead federal claims 
even where state claims might be available. 
A decade after Monroe, the Court applied the same rule to cases 
against federal officers. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, a plaintiff brought a Fourth 
Amendment claim against several federal officers for unlawfully 
searching and seizing him.26 The availability of relief in the case 
turned on whether a cause of action should be “implied” from the 
Fourth Amendment. As in Monroe, the defendants argued that the 
plaintiff may enforce his “rights only by an action in tort, under 
state law.”27 Rejecting this argument, the Court explained: 
[O]ur cases make clear[] [that] the Fourth Amendment oper-
ates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regard-
less of whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exer-
cised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by 
a private citizen. It guarantees to citizens of the United States 
the absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority.28 
Although the Bivens Court adopted the same rule as in Monroe, 
its reasoning was different. The Court did not advert to any 
“prejudice, passion, neglect, [or] intolerance” in state courts, pre-
sumably because common law actions against federal officers will 
24 Because civil rights violations usually occur at the local level, the plaintiff and de-
fendant are typically citizens of the same state, thus precluding federal diversity juris-
diction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). Although common law suits against government offi-
cers often involve federal questions, these questions typically arise as a defense, thus 
precluding federal question jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
25 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180. The classical scholarly citation for this view is Burt 
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). 
26 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
27 Id. at 390. 
28 Id. at 392 (emphasis added). 
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almost always occur in federal court.29 Rather, the Court opined 
that state tort law might be “inconsistent or even hostile” to federal 
civil rights.30 This “inconsistency” or “hostility” stemmed from the 
fact that tort law, though ostensibly similar to constitutional law in 
that it regulates the imposition of physical force, rarely mirrored 
constitutional law from a doctrinal perspective. This entails the risk 
that tort claims would not actually yield relief for civil rights plain-
tiffs. In Bivens itself, for example, the Court doubted that a tres-
pass action by Bivens would be successful because the claim was 
susceptible to the defense of consent (based upon the fact that Bi-
vens allowed the officers, upon their demand, to enter his apart-
ment).31 
Both Monroe and Bivens dealt with the role of state law in fed-
eral constitutional actions. As the corpus of federal statutory law 
slowly grew, however, courts were naturally presented with cases 
where federal statutory and constitutional rights overlapped. In 
these cases, the role of statutory rights has depended on congres-
sional intent. Where the Court believes that Congress intended to 
supplement constitutional rights with statutory rights, the statutory 
rights will have no role in determining whether a constitutional 
cause of action exists. In contrast, where the Court believed that 
Congress intended to replace a constitutional cause of action with a 
statutory cause of action, the Court has yielded to congressional 
preferences. Of course, congressional intent is not easy to discern, 
and the Court’s decision in any case is likely to reflect its presump-
tions about congressional behavior and the judicial role in protect-
ing constitutional rights. For much of the twentieth century, the 
Court, generally speaking, viewed itself as indispensable in protect-
ing rights and assumed that Congress would not lightly replace a 
29 Common law claims against federal officers can be filed in state court, but almost 
always are litigated in federal court because federal officers sued for acts taken within 
the scope of their employment have the right to remove the action to federal court. 28 
U.S.C. § 1442 (2006); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 271 (1879) (holding that crimi-
nal cases for alleged offences against state laws may be removed from state courts to 
federal court if a federal question arises in them). 
30 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394. 
31 Id. (“A private citizen, asserting no authority other than his own, will not nor-
mally be liable in trespass if he demands, and is granted, admission to another’s 
house.”) (citing 1 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 1.11 
(1956)). 
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constitutional cause of action with a statutory one. This attitude led 
to decisions like Carlson v. Green, where the Court held that a fed-
eral prisoner may prosecute an Eighth Amendment claim in a 
Bivens action, even though the misbehavior alleged might also be 
actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.32 
In sum, the traditional rule in federal civil rights actions has been 
to allow plaintiffs to bring constitutional claims even where analo-
gous state law or federal statutory claims were also available. De-
pending on the nature of the case, this rule has been based on three 
separate beliefs: (1) that state courts cannot be trusted to enforce 
civil rights, (2) that state law will only imperfectly enforce federal 
rights, and (3) that Congress has explicitly or implicitly approved 
multiple avenues of enforcement. As the next Section explains, a 
change in these beliefs over the past several decades has coincided 
with a shift in the role of sub-constitutional law in civil rights ac-
tions. 
B. Proxy Enforcement 
Over the past several decades, the Court’s beliefs that give rise 
to its direct enforcement decisions have undergone significant revi-
sions. These revisions, in turn, appear to have precipitated a shift 
away from direct, and towards proxy, enforcement. In this Section, 
I briefly explain these revisions and then illustrate this shift 
through a discussion of recent cases. 
Not long after it condemned state courts as bastions of “preju-
dice, passion, neglect, [or] intolerance,” the Supreme Court 
changed its tune. In 1971, for example, the Burger Court expressed 
its “unwilling[ness] to assume that there now exists a general lack 
of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and 
appellate courts of the several States.”33 Later cases contain similar 
appellations and, whatever the truth of the assertion, the modern 
Court continues to believe that state courts are adequate protec-
tors of civil rights.34 
32 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (preserving a Bivens action even where the plaintiff 
could bring an FTCA claim because “it [is] crystal clear that Congress views FTCA 
and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action”). 
33 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). 
34 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980) (allowing state court decisions to have 
preclusive effect in federal court because, by giving the “parties a full and fair oppor-
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Nor has the Court persisted in its wholesale skepticism of state 
law’s capacity to enforce federal rights. In Bivens cases, therefore, 
the Court now evaluates each case individually to determine 
whether state law is likely to provide the plaintiff with an alterna-
tive remedy. Thus, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, the 
Court considered whether a Bivens claim against a halfway house 
should be permitted even though the plaintiff could have brought a 
claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.35 Responding to the ar-
gument in Bivens that state law was often “inconsistent or even 
hostile” to federal rights, the Court explained that “[s]uch logic 
does not apply” to the instant case.36 Indeed, the Court noted that 
state law may be more beneficial to plaintiffs than federal constitu-
tional law because tort law only requires proof of simple negli-
gence, whereas the Eighth Amendment requires a showing of reck-
less disregard—“a state of mind more blameworthy than 
negligence.”37 Therefore, while future cases may arise where state 
law will be hostile to federal constitutional rights, it is now clear 
that such hostility is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, thus open-
ing the door to proxy enforcement in individual cases. 
Finally, the Court has also changed its views about congressional 
intent in creating federal statutory rights. This is most apparent 
with regard to Bivens actions, for which the Court no longer pre-
sumes that Congress intends statutory causes of action to be sup-
plementary. The Court now sees Bivens actions as federal common 
law and thus presumptively susceptible to legislative override.38 As 
a corollary, even the most basic of statutory remedies can now dis-
tunity to litigate federal claims,” the state court “has shown itself willing and able to 
protect federal rights”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (“Appellee 
is in truth urging us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be 
faithful to their constitutional responsibilities. This we refuse to do.”); Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971) (refusing to intervene in state proceedings based in 
part on the implicit assumption that states can be trusted to adhere to federal consti-
tutional mandates). 
35 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001). 
36 Id. at 73–74. 
37 Id. at 73 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). 
38 See, e.g., id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting a Bivens action by referring to 
Bivens as “a relic of the heady days in which [the] Court assumed common-law pow-
ers to create causes of action”). 
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place the Bivens action.39 Such a shift is not apparent in the Section 
1983 context, however, since Section 1983 is not a judicially created 
cause of action and is thus much less susceptible to legislative over-
ride.40 
Thus, the beliefs that supported the practice of direct enforce-
ment during the civil rights era no longer have the currency they 
once had. One might expect, therefore, to see a shift from direct 
towards proxy enforcement as well. Summarized below are recent 
decisions illustrating this shift, divided according to the type of sub-
constitutional law involved: state law or federal statutory law. 
1. State Law as Proxy 
The most common type of state law used to protect federal con-
stitutional rights is tort law. This makes sense, since many unconsti-
tutional actions are also tortious. Eighth Amendment cases illus-
trate this most readily. In Malesko, for example, a prisoner in a 
federal halfway house brought a Bivens suit after he suffered a 
heart attack allegedly caused by the halfway house’s refusal to ac-
commodate his medical needs.41 Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained that Bivens actions were available 
only to plaintiffs who “lacked any alternative remedy.”42 Malesko 
was not without a remedy, however, because he “enjoy[ed] a paral-
lel tort remedy”—presumably one for negligent care.43 In a break 
with the traditional rule ignoring sub-constitutional law, the Court 
refused to recognize Malesko’s action. Since Malesko, the lower 
courts have seized on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s “any alternative 
remedy” language, repeatedly denying Bivens actions in Eighth 
Amendment cases.44 
39 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (holding that a statutory scheme offering 
less than complete relief for a First Amendment violation could displace a Bivens ac-
tion). 
40 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009) (holding that 
plaintiff could maintain an Equal Protection claim under § 1983 despite having a 
cause of action under Title IX). 
41 534 U.S. 61, 64–65 (2001). 
42 Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). 
43 Id. at 72–73. 
44 See, e.g., Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1254–56 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
a prisoner could not pursue a Bivens action because an alternative state tort remedy 
was available); Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 295–97 (4th Cir. 2006) (refusing to grant a 
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The preclusion of Bivens actions by tort law is not limited to the 
Eighth Amendment context. For instance, in Wilkie v. Robbins, the 
Supreme Court considered a series of Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment claims by a rancher against several federal officials.45 The of-
ficials, the rancher alleged, had exacted retribution on him for fail-
ing to grant the federal government an easement over his land. The 
retribution took the form of, among other things, baseless prosecu-
tions and illegal entry on his land.46 For each of these alleged con-
stitutional wrongs, the Court “assess[ed] the significance of any al-
ternative remedies.”47 In the Court’s view, the plaintiff could likely 
remedy the unfounded prosecutions through a malicious prosecu-
tion action and the illegal entry through a trespass action. These 
“alternative remedies” suggested that a Bivens action should not 
be implied.48 
The Tenth Circuit recently reached a similar conclusion on a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim. In Peoples v. CCA Deten-
tion Centers, a federal inmate alleged that prison officers had 
tapped his phone conversations with his attorney, thus effectively 
denying him the right to an attorney.49 Relying chiefly on Malesko, 
Bivens claim to a prisoner who possessed an alternative remedy under the state law of 
negligence); Irabor v. Perry County Corr. Ctr., No. 06-0483-BH-C, 2008 WL 1929965, 
at *2–*4 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 30, 2008) (holding that a prisoner could not maintain a 
Bivens action for denial of “basic necessities such as socks, toilet paper, and soap” be-
cause “adequate state tort remedies [were] available, . . . including, but not limited to, 
negligence and wantonness”); Kundra v. Johnson, No. H-06-710, 2006 WL 1061913, at 
*3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2006) (holding that a Bivens action is not required against em-
ployees of a privately run prison “where state law provides [the plaintiff] with an ef-
fective remedy”) (citing Holly, 434 F.3d at 296); Brown v. Pugh, No. CV 306-25, 2006 
WL 2439859, at *2–*3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff could not 
bring a Bivens suit against employees of a privately run prison where state court 
remedies were available); Pollard v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. CV F 01 6078 OWW 
WMW P, 2006 WL 2661111, at *3–*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2006) (holding the same). 
45 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
46 Id. at 551. 
47 Id. 
48 Though the Court ultimately declined to dispose of the case on alternative remedy 
grounds (choosing instead to deny the Bivens action based on “special factors”), it is 
clear from the Court’s opinion that state tort law suits do have the power to displace a 
Bivens remedy. Id. at 562. As precedent for its analysis of state tort remedies, the 
Court relied on Malesko’s “consider[ation of the] availability of state tort remedies in 
refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy.” Id. at 551. 
49 422 F.3d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 2005), vacated en banc, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 
2006). Though the Peoples opinion is emblematic of the role of tort law in constitu-
tional tort actions, its precedential value is probably weak. After holding that the state 
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the court reasoned that “the sole purpose [of a Bivens action is] ‘to 
provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual 
officers.’”50 Thus, “a Bivens claim should not be implied unless the 
plaintiff has no other means of redress . . . arising under either state 
or federal law.”51 In this case, the plaintiff’s Bivens claim was pre-
cluded because “Kansas law provides an alternative cause of ac-
tion”—namely, a cause of action for “intrusion upon seclusion.”52 
As the above examples illustrate, tort law is well suited for use in 
proxy enforcement cases. Many constitutional violations involve 
the imposition of force on another, which is a central focus of tort 
law. The logic supporting these decisions, however, is not confined 
to tort law; rather, the logic suggests that any type of state law 
could be a sufficient proxy. Indeed, it would seem that state consti-
tutional law will often lend itself to use in proxy enforcement cases. 
State constitutions contain many of the same provisions contained 
in the Federal Constitution and state courts routinely rely on fed-
eral constitutional precedent in interpreting analogous state provi-
sions.53 Similarly, state statutes and administrative regulations often 
guarantee citizens due process and equality, mimicking various 
constitutional rights.54 Thus, although the role of state law in proxy 
enforcement has thus far only involved tort law, a large variety of 
state laws are likely available should courts wish to invoke them. 
law cause of action displaced the Bivens action, the Tenth Circuit reheard the case en 
banc, splitting evenly on the issue. As a result, the original panel opinion was vacated. 
Despite the vacatur, however, the original Peoples opinion has played a significant 
role in this area. Courts relied on its reasoning prior to the vacatur, and inexplicably, 
have continued to rely on it as good law even after the vacatur. See, e.g., Holly, 434 
F.3d at 301 n.3 (relying on Peoples prior to its vacatur); Bender v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 
539 F. Supp. 2d 702, 708–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying on Peoples after its vacatur). 
Peoples is thus an important case to note in this field, even if its authority is question-
able. 
50 Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1102 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
51 Id. at 1103. 
52 Id. at 1105, 1108 (citing Kan. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 93-93 (1993)). 
53 See James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of Func-
tion in a Federal System 42–52 (2005) (discussing state courts’ “lockstep” method of 
interpreting state constitutional provisions that resemble federal constitutional provi-
sions). 
54 See, e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900 
(West 2005); New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290–301 (McKinney 
2005 & Supp. 2009). 
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2. Federal Law as Proxy 
Sometimes a civil rights action is displaced not by the promise of 
relief under state law, but by the promise of relief under a federal 
statute or regulation. Smith v. Robinson is a good example.55 In 
Smith, parents of a child with cerebral palsy sued a school district 
for discriminating against their child. They alleged a violation of 
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) as well as the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The EHA “estab-
lishe[d] an enforceable substantive right to a free appropriate pub-
lic education.”56 This right was, in turn, enforced through an 
“elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of handi-
capped children. The procedures . . . ensure[d] that hearings con-
ducted by the State [were] fair and adequate.”57 The issue in Smith 
was whether the plaintiffs could pursue an Equal Protection claim 
under Section 1983 simultaneously with an EHA claim. The Court 
answered the question in the negative, chiefly because “Congress 
intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a 
plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed 
special education.”58 
Wilson v. Libby is a more recent example.59 On July 14, 2003, the 
Washington Post printed a column by Robert Novak stating that 
Valerie Plame “is [a Central Intelligence] [A]gency operative on 
weapons of mass destruction.”60 Prior to this column, Plame’s status 
55 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
56 Id. at 1010. 
57 Id. at 1010–11. 
58 Id. at 1009. This holding bears resemblance to the more popular doctrine estab-
lished in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 
453 U.S. 1 (1981), in which the Court held that § 1983 was unavailable to vindicate a 
statutory right because Congress had, elsewhere in the statute, made clear that en-
forcement of the right was to occur under the terms of the statute. Smith and Middle-
sex cases differ in an important respect, however. In Middlesex cases, the court need 
not determine whether the right to be vindicated through § 1983 is “virtually identi-
cal” to the right vindicated through the statutory mechanism. Because the statute cre-
ates the right, they are exactly the same. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) 
(holding that federal statutory rights are enforceable in § 1983 actions). In contrast, 
Smith cases require a court to determine the “virtual identical[ity]” of the constitu-
tional right and the statutory right. In this sense, Smith implicitly holds that Congress 
may preempt a suit for a constitutional violation by creating a statutory right that is 
“virtually identical.” 
59 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
60 Robert D. Novak, Mission to Niger, Wash. Post, July 14, 2003, at A21. 
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as an undercover agent was secret. Novak’s column thus “outed” 
Plame and ended her career as a secret agent. Plame believed that 
top officials in President Bush’s administration—including Vice 
President Richard Cheney, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Karl Rove, 
and Richard Armitage—deliberately leaked Plame’s covert status 
to punish her husband’s prior disloyalty to the Bush administra-
tion.61 She and her husband, Joseph Wilson, thus sued these offi-
cials under Bivens for several constitutional deprivations.62 
At issue in Wilson was whether a Bivens action was available to 
the Wilsons for their various claims. The defendants argued that 
such an action was not available because the Privacy Act—a fed-
eral statute that prohibits the disclosure of federal employee in-
formation in a variety of circumstances, including those present in 
the Wilsons’ case—was a “comprehensive remedial scheme.” 
Though allegedly “comprehensive,” the Privacy Act has several 
gaps. For instance, the Act only provides a damages remedy to the 
“person whose records are actually disclosed.”63 Because Joseph 
Wilson’s own records were not disclosed, he had no cause of action 
under the Act. Additionally, the Act specifically exempts the Of-
fices of the President and Vice President from its coverage.64 Thus  
Valerie Plame’s claims against Cheney, Libby, and Rove would fail 
as a threshold matter. 
Despite these gaps in the Privacy Act, the D.C. Circuit nonethe-
less held that the Privacy Act was a “comprehensive remedial 
scheme” that displaces any remedy available through Bivens. Wil-
61 Such disloyalty was allegedly evidenced by an op-ed in the New York Times in 
which Joseph Wilson refuted President Bush’s earlier claim in a State of the Union 
address that Saddam Hussein had “recently sought significant quantities of uranium 
from Africa.” Joseph C. Wilson 4th, Op-Ed., What I Didn’t Find in Africa, N.Y. 
Times, July 6, 2003, § 6, at 9.  
62 Wilson, 535 F.3d at 703. The Wilsons also brought claims under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act. These claims were dismissed for the Wilson’s failure to timely exhaust 
their administrative remedies. Id. 
63 Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2006). 
64 5 U.S.C § 552a(a)(1) (2006) (adopting definition of “agency” used in the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA)); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 
445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (holding that the Office of the President is not an “agency” 
under FOIA); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 
20, 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (relying on Kissinger to hold that the Office of the Vice Presi-
dent is not an “agency” under FOIA). 
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son is not a recent aberration, however. Courts have also found 
“comprehensive remedial schemes” to displace constitutional ac-
tions in a wide variety of circumstances, including access to infor-
mation,65 veterans’ benefits,66 federal employee rights,67 tax re-
funds,68 and numerous other situations.69 
II. IS PROXY ENFORCEMENT PERMISSIBLE? 
Federal courts possess an enormous amount of discretion, but it 
is not boundless.70 There are thus some things that federal courts 
simply must do. This Part assesses whether enforcing the Constitu-
tion by proxy violates any judicial duty, thus making it an imper-
missible practice. Section II.A explains the judicial duties impli-
cated by this question—the duties to implement constitutional 
norms and follow congressional preferences. Section II.B explains 
the role courts may give to Congress or the states in discharging 
their judicial duties. Section II.C explains that, in light of the judi-
65 Johnson v. Executive Office for U.S. Att’ys, 310 F.3d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(holding that FOIA displaced a Fifth Amendment access-to-information claim). 
66 Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 975–76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the Veter-
ans Judicial Review Act precluded a Bivens claim challenging medical care provided 
by a Veterans Affairs hospital). 
67 Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 1989) (declining to extend Bivens remedy 
for constitutional challenges to minor personnel actions governed by the Civil Service 
Reform Act); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing a 
Bivens action where relief under the Civil Service Reform Act was available); Daly-
Murphy v. Winston, 820 F.2d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a Veterans Af-
fairs employee’s Bivens claim was precluded by the availability of other meaningful 
statutory and administrative remedies); Braun v. United States, 707 F.2d 922, 926 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that an IRS employee had no Bivens claim in part because there 
were alternative remedies available). 
68 Shreiber v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2000). 
69 For a catalogue of federal statutory programs that have been held to preclude a 
Bivens action, see Practicing Law Institute, New Developments in Civil Rights Litiga-
tion and Trends in Section 1983 Actions, 665 Litig. & Admin. Prac. 869, 1093–94 
(2001). 
70 The classic article on judicial discretion in the federal courts is David L. Shapiro, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985). Throughout this Article, I 
focus on proxy enforcement from the perspective of the federal judiciary. I adopt the 
view of the federal judiciary mainly for ease of explanation and do not mean to sug-
gest that proxy enforcement will not or should not occur in state courts. State courts 
will be obliged to adhere to whatever rule of enforcement is chosen by the Supreme 
Court. See Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional 
Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1073–79 (1967) (explaining that federal common 
law binds state courts via the Supremacy Clause). 
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cial duties identified in Section II.A and the possibility for congres-
sional or state input identified in Section II.B, federal courts are 
therefore free to apply sub-constitutional law in civil rights actions, 
provided that the sub-constitutional law would uphold constitu-
tional norms. Finally, Section II.D, which offers several illustra-
tions of this analysis in practice. 
A. Federal Judicial Duty 
Federal courts serve many roles in our constitutional system. 
Chief among them, however, is the maintenance of the constitu-
tional order by requiring non-Article III actors (Congress, the Ex-
ecutive, and the states) to adhere to constitutional norms. At the 
same time, federal courts are courts and thus must do what any 
court does: follow the applicable law. In this Section, I explain that 
federal courts have a duty to craft judicial doctrine so that constitu-
tional norms will remain effectual, as well as a duty to follow valid 
congressional directives. I reject, however, any claim that federal 
courts have a mandatory duty to right every constitutional wrong. 
1. Implementing the Constitution 
The founding generation, having suffered the pains of colonial 
rule, was dedicated to the preservation of individual liberty.71 Al-
though the Bill of Rights is now seen as the font of liberty, this was 
not always so. Indeed, during that hot summer of 1787, delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected inclusion of a bill 
of rights in the new constitution.72 For the Founders, liberty was to 
be secured through the structuring of government, not through a 
declaration of individual rights. Rights were not irrelevant, of 
course—a fact amply illustrated by the prompt adoption of the Bill 
of Rights in 1791. But enumerated rights could never protect lib-
erty on their own; such rights would amount to little more than 
“parchment barriers” if government were not properly structured 
71 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (tying institutional design to the “preservation of liberty”). 
72 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 649 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
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to give them effect.73 Thus, the “structure of the government is a vi-
tal part of a constitutional organism whose final cause is the protec-
tion of individual rights.”74 
The animating features of the Constitution’s structure have been 
rehearsed innumerable times and need not be repeated en toto 
here. For the present purposes, it is enough to note two essential 
structural choices. One is the separation of powers. Steeped in the 
political writings of John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu,75 the 
Founders believed that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legisla-
tive, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”76 The Founders there-
fore created a government where one branch would be charged 
with making law, one with executing law, and one with resolving 
individual disputes of law. 
Separating raw power into its constituent parts, though neces-
sary to protect liberty, was not sufficient to secure it. If an individ-
ual branch transgressed its enumerated powers and other branches 
had no ability to counteract the transgression, a balanced govern-
ment could hardly be maintained. Thus, the Founders created 
mechanisms whereby each branch “may be a check on the other.”77 
73 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 The Writ-
ings of James Madison 269, 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904) (referring to enumerated 
rights as “parchment barriers” and explaining that “the real power [to oppress] lies in 
the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be ap-
prehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but 
from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of 
the Constituents”); see also Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (2008) (stating 
that, when it comes to protecting liberty, “[s]tructure is everything”). 
74 Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1513, 1514 (1991); see also David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist 45 
(1984) (“The Federalist insists that the real protection against abuse is to be found not 
in any limitation of the government’s powers but in the government’s structure, in 
how it is ‘modeled.’”). 
75 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“Even a cursory examination of the 
Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu’s thesis that checks and balances 
were the foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty.”); M.J.C. 
Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 72–74 (1998) (characterizing 
Locke as “the Father of the United States Constitution” with regard to dividing sov-
ereign power into its executive and legislative components). 
76 The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 71, at 301. 
77 The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 71, at 322; see also Garry 
Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist 119 (1981) (“Checks and balances have to 
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The President was granted authority to veto bills and appoint 
judges; Congress was empowered to impeach judges and executive 
officials; et cetera. And with regard to the courts, “the Foun-
ders . . . positioned the judiciary to keep the political branches 
within the bounds of their lawful authority.”78 Yet, the judiciary 
was also positioned to keep the states—given as they were to 
“populist, parochial passions”79—within the bounds of law as well.80 
Thus, for the Constitution to work—for it truly to  protect lib-
erty—the federal courts must fulfill their structural role of superin-
tending Congress, the Executive, and the states. But how is the ju-
diciary to discharge this duty? Perhaps the best place to begin is 
with Chief Justice Marshall’s celebrated claim that it is the “duty of 
do with corrective invasion of the separated powers . . . .”). For an explanation of 
these checks, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A 
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393, 427–34 (1996). 
78 Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Struc-
tural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1239, 1283 (2002); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 
(1974) (“Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret 
the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by 
another branch.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Fallon & Meltzer, 
supra note 11, at 1788 (“The Constitution thus contemplates a judicial ‘check’ on the 
political branches not merely to redress particular violations, but to ensure that gov-
ernment generally respects constitutional values—one of the hallmarks of the rule of 
law.”). For originalist defenses of judicial review, see Randy E. Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of Judicial Power, 12 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 115 (2004); Saikrishna B. Prakash 
& John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887 (2003). For a 
recent structural defense of judicial review, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an 
Uneasy Case For Judicial Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (2008). 
79 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity 
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 
696, 709 (1998); see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the 
American Constitution 18–23 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that the “excesses of democ-
racy” in the states underlay the design of the Constitution); Jack N. Rakove, James 
Madison and the Creation of the American Republic 44–52 (1990) (explaining the dif-
ficulty of controlling states under the Articles of Confederation). 
80 This was accomplished through use of the Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const. art. VI; 
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 79, at 729–31; Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifica-
tions for Judicial Independence, 95 Geo L.J. 1061, 1068–69 (2007) (“The significance 
of the Supremacy Clause cannot be understated. It not only confirmed the status of 
the Constitution as fundamental law, but it also made the enforcement of its essential 
division of power between the Union and the States an inherently judicial function. 
Rather than give the national government the power to coerce States to do their duty, 
or abrogate the residual sovereignty of the States by subjecting their laws to prior 
congressional approval, the Constitution made the judiciary the first responders to 
disputes over the boundaries of federalism.”). 
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the judicial department to say what the law is.”81 According to this 
description of judicial duty, federal courts “lay the article of the 
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is chal-
lenged and . . . decide whether the latter squares with the former.”82 
If, for example, Congress enacts a statute setting the minimum age 
for U.S. Senators at thirty-five years old, and a thirty-two-year-old 
elected by her state is refused a seat in the Senate, the court’s duty 
in an ensuing lawsuit is straightforward: the court must “say” that 
the Constitution requires only that Senators have “attained to the 
Age of thirty Years” and that the statute is therefore ineffectual.83 
By holding as such, the court preserves liberty in the general sense 
by keeping the legislature within its bounds. It resists those who 
would ignore the limits of their authority. 
“Saying what the law is” is rarely as simple as the preceding ex-
ample, of course. When presented with questions implicating the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the speech 
and religion clauses, for example, “lawsaying” is a more difficult 
enterprise.84 In these circumstances, simply reading the Constitu-
tion will never be enough to answer the question presented. Until 
recently, battles over judicial lawsaying were waged primarily in 
terms of interpretation. Constitutional decisions could be justified, 
or not, depending on whether one was an intentionalist or an 
originalist, among other types.85 In recent years, however, the focus 
81 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
82 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936); see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
at 178 (“[I]f both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the 
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitu-
tion; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must deter-
mine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of 
judicial duty.”). 
83 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained 
to the Age of thirty Years . . . .”). 
84 Kermit Roosevelt III, Judicial Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper v. Aaron and 
Parents Involved, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 1191, 1192 (2008) (“[L]aying an article of the 
Constitution beside a statute achieves nothing in any but the most trivial case.”); id. at 
1192 n.14 (“[L]aying down the Equal Protection Clause will not take a court very far, 
while laying down an ‘ink blot’ such as the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause may make things worse.”). 
85 For a recent accounting of various methods of constitutional interpretation, see 
Symposium, Essays on Originalism, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 901 (2008). 
PREIS PRE PP 10/20/2009 7:31 PM 
1686 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:1663 
 
has shifted from interpretation to implementation86—based in great 
part upon the observation that no theory of interpretation could, 
according to its own terms, accomplish what the Constitution re-
quires the judiciary to accomplish: “keep[ing] the political branches 
within the bounds of their lawful authority.”87 
Take, for example, the question of custodial interrogations. The 
Fifth Amendment prohibits the state from “compel[ling] [a sus-
pect] in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”88 By any 
fair reading, the Amendment prohibits states from physically co-
ercing suspects to confess. For many years, courts determined 
whether a confession was coerced based on the “totality of circum-
stances.”89 The defendant and the state would present evidence 
proving or disproving the use of force, threats, intimidation, etc. 
Quite predictably, these were difficult decisions for courts. There 
was rarely any physical evidence and all witnesses—the officers 
and the defendant—were highly biased. Moreover, in many cases, 
the state’s witnesses were likely to be familiar to the presiding 
judge, thus raising the specter of judicial bias. Trial court decisions 
could be appealed, of course, but deferential standards of review 
precluded any meaningful scrutiny. In short, this doctrinal scheme 
carried with it a considerable risk that widespread police coercion 
would take hold. 
Enter Miranda v. Arizona.90 In that case, the Court held that an 
interrogation not preceded by certain warnings would be deemed 
per se coerced. Whatever its normative value, the decision can 
hardly be characterized as an “interpretation” of the Fifth 
Amendment. Yet, at the same time, the ruling was constitutionally 
required: the Constitution clearly prohibits coercive interrogations 
and the pre-Miranda doctrine was insufficient to check such mis-
86 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 37 (2001) (“If we 
had to choose one word to characterize the proper role of the Supreme Court in con-
stitutional adjudication, it should not be ‘interpretation,’ but ‘implementation.’”). 
87 Molot, supra note 78, at 1283; see also Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme 
Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to 
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 45, 66–67 (1981) 
(interpreting congressional authority to regulate federal jurisdiction so as not to de-
feat the judiciary’s “essential function” in the constitutional system). 
88 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
89 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963). 
90 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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behavior. To stand idle while Fifth Amendment guarantees were 
being violated would amount to an abdication of judicial duty. 
Thus, if we are to take seriously the judiciary’s structural role in 
holding non-judicial actors accountable, we must accept that the 
judiciary will often craft rules that implement constitutional guar-
antees, even if those rules cannot be ordinarily described as the 
product of “interpretation.” In other words, constitutional supervi-
sion may not operate according to the strict terms of the Constitu-
tion—an observation that opens the door to the use of sub-
constitutional law in constitutional enforcement. 
This is not to say that the judiciary has carte blanche to enforce 
the constitutional order in any manner it chooses. The Supreme 
Court could hardly dispatch a roving band of U.S. Marshals to sit 
in on police interrogations. But, the judiciary is free to act as a ju-
diciary. Federal courts, the Supreme Court has recognized, are free 
to act in ways “traditionally done in order to accomplish their as-
signed tasks.”91 Thus, federal courts may decide cases through the 
application of law, precedent, and traditional forms of legal reason-
ing.92 For hundreds of years, courts have created and relied on judi-
cial tools such as bright-line rules, evidentiary presumptions, and 
standards of review.93 These and other such rules are rarely dic-
tated by any legal text, but are usually created to better achieve 
91 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 58 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As with any 
inherent judicial power . . . we should exercise [our remedial powers] in a manner 
consistent with our history and traditions.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent 
Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 741 
(2001) (stating that the judicial power is limited to those practices “rooted in historical 
Anglo-American practice”). 
92 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 72, at 430 (Aug. 27, 
1787) (statement of James Madison) (expressing conviction that only “cases of a Judi-
ciary Nature” be allocated to the judicial department, lest the judiciary improperly 
interfere with political decisions); 1 The Works of James Wilson 296 (Robert G. 
McCloskey ed., 1967) (“The judicial power consists in applying, according to the prin-
ciples of right and justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in 
cases. . . .”); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a 
“Golden Parachute,” 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1397, 1414 (2005) (“By using the word 
‘judges,’ however, the Constitution incorporates the essential powers and duties of a 
judge, as understood at the founding.”). 
93 See Fallon, supra note 86, at 78–79 (cataloguing doctrinal tests that cannot be 
traced to constitutional text, including “forbidden content tests,” “suspect-content 
tests,” “balancing tests,” “non-suspect-content tests,” “effects tests,” “purpose tests,” 
and “appropriate deliberation tests”). 
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some legal end. The creation of a per se rule in Miranda was an en-
tirely ordinary judicial act. Indeed, those who have studied judicial 
behavior closely explain that such acts are “the norm, not the ex-
ception.”94 
Miranda is thus one example of the duty of constitutional im-
plementation—the duty to craft judicial doctrine so that constitu-
tional norms will, on the whole, be maintained. No doubt, there are 
many who will deny the legitimacy of implementation, decrying its 
atextual nature and ends-oriented methodology.95 These criticisms 
are susceptible to an important retort, however: the Constitution 
does not mandate any particular method of interpretation, but does 
require the judiciary “to ensure that government generally respects 
constitutional values—one of the hallmarks of the rule of law.”96 
Put differently, whatever method of interpretation the judiciary 
deems appropriate, that method must make the Constitution real—
it must lead to rules that stand in the way of, rather than counte-
nance, widespread police coercion. Courts may not hide behind 
sub-constitutional theories of interpretation while constitutional 
disorder slowly unfolds around them.97 
94 David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 195 
(1988) (“Constitutional law is filled with rules that are justified in ways that are ana-
lytically indistinguishable from the justifications for the Miranda rules.”); see also 
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 61–78 (2004) 
(offering numerous illustrations for the proposition that such rules are a “ubiquitous 
component of constitutional doctrine”). 
95 Even originalists, however, admit that original public meaning sometimes cannot 
always resolve a case on its own. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) 
(Scalia, J.) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citi-
zens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of tech-
nology.”); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, 
Original Intent, and Judicial Review 7 (1999) (admitting that, “[r]egardless of the ex-
tent of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution, there will remain 
an impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered [through inter-
pretation]” and that courts, at that point, must “construct” the text’s meaning). 
96 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1788. 
97 See Fallon, supra note 86, at 18 (“Even if we accept that [the Constitution] is ex-
clusively the written Constitution that the Court should interpret or implement, it 
does not necessarily follow that interpretive norms should be based solely on the 
Constitution’s text, heedless of the way courts have interpreted the Constitution over 
time. To determine what needs to be interpreted is one thing; to identify applicable 
norms of interpretation may be something else.”). I do not intend this point as a facial 
attack on originalist theories of constitutional interpretation. Rather, I simply chal-
lenge its use in situations that would lead to the inevitable breakdown of the constitu-
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2. Implementing Congressional Preferences 
The judiciary’s obligation to superintend the constitutional order 
is not exclusive. Congress must also take care to enforce constitu-
tional norms rather than contradict them.98 Where Congress at-
tempts to promote constitutional values through a statute, the judi-
ciary will thus be presented with the choice between implementing 
the Constitution on terms chosen by the judiciary or on terms cho-
sen by Congress. This situation implicates a second type of judicial 
duty: the duty to implement congressional preferences. Under this 
duty, the judiciary must give effect to all validly enacted federal 
statutes. 
Thus, if Congress orders federal courts to enforce the Constitu-
tion directly, without regard to whether sub-constitutional law 
might also provide relief, the courts must obey this command. 
Conversely, if Congress orders federal courts to rely on sub-
constitutional law when available, even in cases where constitu-
tional law would also apply, the courts must obey this edict as 
well.99 
Of course, these statutory commands are only binding if they are 
in fact constitutional. It should go without saying that statutory 
commands can be constitutionally infirm for a multitude of rea-
sons. Generally speaking, statutes will be invalid if they impinge on 
an individual right (for example, the free exercise of religion) or 
address a subject outside Congress’ power to regulate (for exam-
ple, wholly intrastate commerce). Of particular import in proxy en-
tional order. Where such circumstances are not presented, the validity of originalism 
is completely unaffected by the arguments presented herein. 
 For further observations on the interaction between originalism and constitutional 
implementation, see infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text. 
98 Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 
27 Stan. L. Rev. 585, 587 (1975) (relying in part on constitutional text to justify the 
“self-evident” proposition that “legislators are obligated to determine, as best they 
can, the constitutionality of proposed legislation” and refrain from enacting unconsti-
tutional laws); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underen-
forced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1227 (1978) (“At a minimum, the 
obligation of public officials in this context, as in any other, is one of ‘best efforts’ to 
avoid unconstitutional conduct.”). 
99 One might challenge this claim by arguing that federal courts have a duty to issue 
a remedy for every constitutional violation. As I explain in the following Subsection, 
this challenge is not justified. See infra Subsection II.A.3. 
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forcement cases, congressional power is limited by the “judicial 
power” granted to the federal courts in Article III.100 
A short example will illustrate this. Suppose Congress enacts a 
federal statute creating free speech rights and then amends Section 
1983 by excluding free speech claims from its coverage. The federal 
statute, however, prohibits courts from issuing injunctive relief, 
limits damages to $100, and prohibits successful plaintiffs from re-
covering attorney’s fees. The federal statute, in other words, se-
verely curtails remedies for free speech violations and thus creates 
a significant risk of widespread speech deprivation. This statute—
which essentially replaces direct enforcement via Section 1983 with 
proxy enforcement via a federal statute—would likely be constitu-
tionally infirm. This statute would essentially force the federal 
courts to sit idly by while the First Amendment is rendered a nul-
lity, a prospect that subverts the structural choices underlying the 
Constitution. While Congress has the authority to strip the courts 
of jurisdiction, it does not have the power to handicap the courts in 
such a way as to divest them of their essential structural func-
tions.101 
I do not argue here that all statutes limiting judicial remedies 
would be constitutionally suspect, though that argument may have 
significant force.102 A statute that limits damages in free speech 
cases to $500,000 would not likely endanger the constitutional or-
der, even though at least some plaintiffs would have their remedies 
100 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.”); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 79, at 708 (explaining that 
the grant of “judicial Power” to the federal judiciary in Article III limits congressional 
power to curtail core judicial practices). 
101 Although some believe that Congress enjoys complete control over judicial 
remedies, see generally John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Con-
stitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2513 (1998), others argue that federal courts have 
core remedial powers ancillary to their Article III grant of “judicial Power.” See, e.g., 
David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial 
Branch, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 75, 170 (1999) (arguing that federal courts have autono-
mous remedial power because remedies are “the most fundamental and essential 
element of judicial power”); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional 
Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Const. Comment. 191, 226 (2001) (argu-
ing that Congress may not curtail judicial remedies); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, 
Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2537 (1998) (defending judicial 
power over remedies). 
102 Engdahl, supra note 101, at 170; Lawson, supra note 101, at 226. 
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curtailed. Similarly, a statute that shifts certain types of constitu-
tional adjudications out of the federal courts and into administra-
tive tribunals might not risk the constitutional order, provided ap-
propriate safeguards were put in place.103 What matters to my 
analysis here is not necessarily whether judicial power is limited in 
any particular way, but whether that limit is likely to place the con-
stitutional order at risk. Where limits are imposed, but a risk of 
constitutional disorder is not created, the statute will be entirely 
constitutional under this analysis.104 
In sum, federal courts have a duty to implement congressional 
preferences on constitutional enforcement (whether direct or 
proxy), provided those directives are validly enacted. A statute that 
deprives federal courts of their essential structural role is not a 
valid statute and must be ignored by the courts. 
3. Correcting Wrongs 
“One of the first duties of government,” Chief Justice Marshall 
declared in Marbury v. Madison, is to “furnish [a] remedy for the 
violation of a vested legal right.”105 Since Marbury, many in the 
federal courts field have embraced this principle, known more fa-
miliarly by the refrain “a right without a remedy is no right at 
all.”106 Under this principle, federal courts have a duty to remedy 
every constitutional violation, even if a remedy is not required to 
preserve the constitutional order107 or a statute does not order the 
courts to issue a remedy.108 Adherents to this principle see judicial 
103 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443–48 (1944) (holding that Con-
gress could prohibit a criminal defendant from raising a constitutional defense be-
cause the defendant had the opportunity to raise the issue in a prior administrative 
proceeding); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49–65 (1932) (holding that an adminis-
trative tribunal could adjudicate an Article III case, provided that an Article III court 
retained ultimate authority on legal and jurisdictional questions). 
104 I stress that my focus here is only on the structural imperatives underlying judicial 
review. As noted above, some believe that Congress may not have the authority to 
limit judicial remedies, even if such limitations would not risk the constitutional order. 
See supra note 102. 
105 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
106 Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 209 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also 
Bandes, supra note 11; Ziegler, supra note 11. 
107 See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
108 See supra Subsection II.A.2. 
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remedies as a form of “corrective justice”—a fundamental value 
inherent in adjudication.109 
Though the right-remedy principle has significant normative ap-
peal, it has considerably less basis in constitutional law. First, a 
broad principle of corrective justice can be found nowhere in the 
text, structure, or history of the Constitution. Of the entire docu-
ment, only the Fifth Amendment (which orders “just compensa-
tion” for “private property . . . taken for public use”) and the Sus-
pension Clause (which safeguards the availability of the writ of 
habeas corpus) contemplate a remedy for a particular wrong.110 
Nowhere else are remedies mentioned, which is significant since so 
many state constitutions specifically guaranteed remedies for 
wrongs.111 This makes perfect sense because, as described above, 
liberty was originally to be protected through structural arrange-
ments, not a system of rights and remedies.112 Moreover, judicial 
doctrine has long treated the right-remedy principle as precatory, 
often refusing to issue relief in cases of sovereign or official immu-
nity.113 In short, “[t]he dictum of Marbury v. Madison notwithstand-
109 Some might argue that right-remedy principle is borne not of a penchant for cor-
rective justice, but of deterrence. Only by providing a remedy for every wrong, the 
argument goes, can the federal courts adequately deter constitutional violations. Al-
though deterrence, as noted above, is an appropriate goal for federal remedies, ade-
quate deterrence does not require strict adherence to the right-remedy principle. Op-
timal levels of deterrence can rarely be reduced to the one-to-one formula that the 
principle implies. This is especially true in the field of constitutional torts, where 
agency relationships are often convoluted and official immunity questions feature 
prominently in nearly every suit. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: 
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345 
(2000). Thus, even if the principle is understood as a tool of deterrence, there is noth-
ing in the Constitution that requires the federal courts to deter unconstitutional con-
duct according to a specific ratio. This is not to say that issuing a remedy for every 
wrong is normatively undesirable. Empirical analyses may in fact confirm the wisdom 
of the principle and recommend its increased usage. Rather, it is simply to say that the 
right-remedy principle is not constitutionally compelled. 
110 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; U.S. Const. amend. V. 
111 Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1309, 1310 (2003) (noting that the right to a remedy “expressly or implicitly appears in 
forty state constitutions”); id. at 1310 n.6 (providing citations to individual state con-
stitutions). 
112 See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
113 See Bellia, supra note 11, at 784 (stating that the right-remedy principle in Eng-
lish law “was not a black letter legal doctrine; it was merely a platitude”); Fallon & 
Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1779–87 (“Notwithstanding Marbury’s contrary intimations, 
the structure of substantive, jurisdictional, and remedial doctrines that existed at the 
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ing, there is no right to an individually effective remedy for every 
constitutional violation. The ultimate commitment of the law of 
[constitutional] remedies . . . is to create schemes and incentives 
adequate to keep government, overall and on average, tolerably 
within the bounds of law.”114 
Second, the right-remedy principle incorrectly implies that every 
constitutional harm must be remedied in a constitutional case. 
Early judicial practices belie this claim, however—a point that, 
ironically enough, is well illustrated by Marbury itself. As is well 
known, William Marbury sought the Supreme Court’s help in se-
curing his position as justice of the peace for the District of Co-
lumbia. The Secretary of State in John Adams’ administration 
(none other than John Marshall himself) had failed to deliver Mar-
bury’s commission to him before Thomas Jefferson became Presi-
dent. Jefferson ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, to 
withhold the commission. This, Marbury alleged, violated his statu-
tory right to the commission.115 Marbury thus brought a mandamus 
action—a type of civil rights action demanding that a government 
official obey the law—to force Madison to deliver the commis-
sion.116 A mandamus was an extraordinary remedy, however, and it 
was unavailable if more traditional remedies were sufficient. Thus, 
every mandamus action, including Marbury’s, required the court to 
determine whether alternative means were available to remedy the 
harm alleged. Chief Justice Marshall did just this in Marbury. 
Madison had contended that Marbury’s application for mandamus 
was displaced by a common law action for detinue, which allowed 
one to retrieve a lost “thing . . . or its value.”117 According to Mar-
time of the Constitution’s framing and that evolved through the nineteenth century by 
no means guaranteed effective redress for all invasions of legally protected rights and 
interests.”). 
114 Fallon, supra note 14, at 311. 
115 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154, 162 (1803) (stating that Mar-
bury’s right “originate[d] in an act of congress passed in February 1801” and that “the 
law creating the office [to which Marbury was commissioned], gave [Marbury] a right 
to hold for five years”). It is of no matter that Marbury was asserting a statutory as 
opposed to a constitutional right, for both are public rights. 
116 For background on the mandamus action and its role in enforcing the rule of law, 
see Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1963); Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review By Pre-
rogative Writ: Certiorari and Mandamus, 9 N.Y. L. F. 478 (1963). 
117 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173. 
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shall, a detinue action would not provide Marbury with relief since 
a public office was not a “thing” that could be retrieved and the 
“value of a public office . . . is incapable of being ascertained.”118 
Thus, having found detinue law insufficient to provide relief, Mar-
shall found that Marbury had stated “a plain case for a manda-
mus.”119 It is clear from the case, however, that if detinue law (or 
some similar common law action) had been available, Marbury’s 
enforcement action against the Secretary of State would have lay 
not in public law, but simply in the private law of tort.120 
Marbury thus illustrates that private law was an accepted tool for 
enforcing public law obligations. This aspect of Marbury is by no 
means aberrational. Scholars who have studied early constitutional 
enforcement agree that “[t]he predominant method of suing offi-
cers in the early nineteenth century was an allegation of common 
law harm, particularly a physical trespass.”121 Thus, the Founders 
assumed that the common law, not the Constitution, would remedy 
government wrongs.122 In light of this, it is fallacious to posit that 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 See Bellia, supra note 11, at 787–88; Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Im-
munity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 396, 420–21 (1987). 
121 Woolhandler, supra note 120, at 399; see also Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 
and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade 
Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (1985) (“[I]n the first 70 years of the Republic, many 
of the Supreme Court’s important constitutional decisions came in suits in which de-
fendants sought, on constitutional grounds, to avoid liability, rather than in suits in 
which plaintiffs sought to obtain damages or injunctive relief for alleged constitutional 
violations.”); Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Acts, 
and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 Geo. L.J. 1493, 1510 (1989) (“Traditionally, gov-
ernmental actors were liable at common law for injuries inflicted in the course of their 
employment.”); Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1122–
23 (1969) (noting that, in the nineteenth century, “the view developed that the gov-
ernmental officer acting under a void statute, or outside the bounds of a valid statute, 
may be regarded as stripped of his official character, and answerable, like any private 
citizen, for conduct which, when attributable to a private citizen, would be an offense 
against person or property”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural 
Reform Revisited, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1400 (2007) (stating that, in early America, 
“there was no distinctively federal cause of action to remedy constitutional viola-
tions,” so “[a]ctions against officers typically alleged a common law harm”). 
122 Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 20–
21 (1997). This is consistent with English practice at the time of the founding, which 
was well-known to the Founders. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 
(K.B. 1765); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 
Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 
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federal courts have a duty to imply a remedy directly from the 
Constitution for every constitutional wrong. Constitutional reme-
dies need only be implied as necessary to maintain the constitu-
tional order. 
* * * 
In sum, federal courts have a general duty to implement consti-
tutional norms through doctrine, but also have a duty to prioritize 
congressional implementing preferences over judicial preferences. 
Federal courts have no duty, however, to issue a remedy in each 
and every case. I now turn to a deeper analysis of the judiciary’s 
implementing rules, a discussion that reveals the surprising degree 
to which congressional preferences can replace judicial prefer-
ences. 
B. The Status of Judicial Implementing Rules 
In discharging their duty to implement constitutional norms,123 
federal courts produce judicial decisions. For a long time, decisions 
with a constitutional element, such as Miranda, were known simply 
as “constitutional law.” In one sense, this was descriptively accu-
rate, as such judicial decisions clearly involve the Constitution and 
have the force of law. Though accurate, the terminology inhibited a 
deeper understanding of judicial behavior in constitutional cases. 
In 1975, Henry Monaghan suggested that decisions like Miranda 
were perhaps not “constitutional” law at all. He explained that a 
“surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional 
‘interpretation’ is best understood as something of a quite different 
order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial 
rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required 
by, various constitutional provisions.”124 Monaghan called this 
“substructure” of law “constitutional common law.”125 
In the past decade, several scholars have developed a robust the-
ory of constitutional decisionmaking based on Monaghan’s original 
107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 772 n.54 (1994) (“The Wilkes case was a cause célèbre in the 
colonies, where ‘Wilkes and Liberty’ became a rallying cry for all those who hated 
government oppression.”). 
123 See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
124 Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional 
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (1975). 
125 Id. 
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description of constitutional common law. Professors Richard 
Fallon,126 Mitchell Berman,127 and Kermit Roosevelt128 have ex-
plained that judges engage in two “conceptually distinctive” behav-
iors when adjudicating most constitutional cases.129 One behavior is 
the assigning of meaning to the “constitutional operative proposi-
tion.”130 Constitutional operative propositions are the specific, tex-
tually self-defining directives found within the Constitution. To wit: 
Senators must be thirty years old,131 trials must be by jury (except in 
cases of impeachment),132 and statutes imposing taxes must origi-
nate in the House of Representatives.133 Even ambiguous clauses, 
however, will still contain a core operative proposition. For exam-
ple, although the Equal Protection Clause might mean many 
things, it at least means that “the government may not treat some 
people worse than others without adequate justification.”134 In ad-
judicating cases that implicate an operative proposition, courts will 
often simply apply the operative proposition just as it is written, 
such as in the case of eligibility requirements for U.S. Senators. 
Sometimes, however, the operative proposition, though relevant to 
the case, will be opaque with regard to the specific issue pre-
sented—such as in a case falling outside the core meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause. In these instances, federal courts engage 
in a second type of behavior: the crafting of “constitutional deci-
sion rules.”135 
126 Fallon, supra note 86; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 
Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 61–75 (1997). 
127 Berman, supra note 94, at 32–39. 
128 Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What 
the Court Does, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1652–58 (2005); see also Dan T. Coenen, A 
Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look 
Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1575, 1580–84 (2001). 
129 Fallon, supra note 86, at 38. 
130 Berman, supra note 94, at 15. 
131 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 3. 
132 U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2. 
133 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 7. 
134 Roosevelt, supra note 128, at 1657 (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted). For other formulations of the Equal Protection Clause’s core meaning, see Ber-
man, supra note 94, at 9 (“[G]overnment may not classify individuals in ways not rea-
sonably designed to promote a legitimate state interest.”); Sager, supra note 98, at 
1215 (“A state may treat persons differently only when it is fair to do so.”). 
135 Berman, supra note 94, at 15. 
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A constitutional decision rule is a rule of decision designed to 
implement constitutional operative propositions. For example, 
upon reading that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the state from 
“compel[ling] [a defendant] in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself,” a court can reasonably conclude that the state 
may not physically coerce witnesses during interrogations.136 Hav-
ing assigned meaning to the operative proposition, the court must 
then consider whether the proposition can be applied on its own 
terms, or must be implemented with a decision rule. As explained 
in the preceding Section, the Supreme Court designed the Miranda 
decision rule to implement Fifth Amendment guarantees because a 
straightforward application of the Fifth Amendment could not, in 
practice, preserve Fifth Amendment rights.137 
Other examples abound.138 By way of further illustration, con-
sider just two. In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a police department may screen job applicants using 
an examination “designed to test verbal ability, vocabulary, read-
ing and comprehension,” even though the test disadvantaged Afri-
can-American applicants.139 The precise issue was whether a test 
adopted without a discriminatory motive, but nonetheless having a 
discriminatory impact, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The 
Court said no; it was the state’s motive, not the effects of its behav-
ior, that mattered. Compare this to Lemon v. Kurtzman.140 There, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute that re-
imbursed parochial school teachers who taught public school stu-
dents. The Court held the statute unconstitutional because the 
statute’s “principal or primary effect” was the advancement of re-
136 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
137 See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
138 See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Judicial Activism 19 (2006) (noting that 
“constitutional decisionmaking” involves numerous atextual rules, such as “tiers of 
scrutiny, five-factor tests, requirements of congruence and proportionality, . . . undue 
burden analysis, . . . bewildering distinctions, between content-based and content-
neutral regulations of speech, between hard and soft money, between intentional dis-
crimination and disparate impact”); Berman, supra note 94, at 61–78 (noting the use 
of decision rules in various constitutional doctrines); Fallon, supra note 86, at 78–79 
(listing different types of doctrinal tests, including “forbidden-content tests,” “sus-
pect-content tests,” “balancing tests,” “non-suspect-content tests,” “effects tests,” 
“purpose tests,” and “appropriate deliberation tests”). 
139 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976). 
140 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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ligion.141 Unlike in Washington, “effects” mattered this time. Wash-
ington and Lemon might appear contradictory on their face, but 
only if one believes that the Court was interpreting the Constitu-
tion in both cases. This, however, is untenable. Both the First 
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause are utterly opaque with 
regard to the status of unintended effects. Washington and Lemon, 
like so much constitutional doctrine, can only be understood as ex-
amples of constitutional implementation through decision rules—
the judiciary’s effort to create doctrine so that constitutional norms 
may be realized. 
It is appropriate to pause here and field a question that is certain 
to arise in the reader’s mind: how does the judiciary know what our 
nation’s “constitutional norms” are? Indeed, if posed rhetorically, 
this question amounts to an important criticism, for it conveys a 
suspicion that the judicial articulation of constitutional norms de-
rives not from the Constitution, but from the judges’ own personal 
norms. This criticism appeals to the charms of originalism, an issue 
I addressed briefly above.142 There, I answered the originalist 
charge that constitutional implementation was illegitimate by 
pointing out that originalism, inasmuch as it fails to check lawless-
ness by non-Article III actors, is thus sometimes illegitimate itself. 
Here, I answer the slightly different charge that even if originalism 
might sometimes be illegitimate, it is still superior to open-ended 
implementation because it better tethers unelected decisionmakers 
to objectively ascertainable standards—that is, constitutional text. 
Such beneficent limitations will operate across the entire range of 
constitutional decisions, thus offsetting the relatively few circum-
stances where originalism may fail to check abuses by non-Article 
III actors. The argument, in short, is that it is better to check the 
judges all of the time than for the judges to check everybody else 
some of the time. 
This argument is not without force, but it overestimates the con-
straining force of constitutional text. The Fourth Amendment, for 
example, says not one whit about whether police officers may use 
141 Id. at 612–14. 
142 See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
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thermal imaging devices to search homes without a warrant.143 Nor 
does Article III provide any more than the barest guidance on 
whether the slow loss of shoreline due to rising sea levels is a harm 
sufficient to challenge a federal agency’s response to global warm-
ing.144 In deciding these questions, just like so many others in con-
stitutional adjudication, courts necessarily run out of text. Thus, 
originalists, whether they admit it or not, are often unchecked by 
constitutional text.145 They, like all judges, must resort to extra-
textual sources—history, tradition, structure, precedent, policy—to 
resolve cases. In consulting these sources, judges search not for 
“meaning” in the textual sense, but for meaning in a deeper sense. 
They seek to uncover the deep-seated norms that have guided our 
country, but are not exhausted in constitutional text. It is from this 
process that judges determine constitutional norms, and it is a 
process in which all judges engage. Thus, the project of implement-
ing constitutional norms, while dangerously open-ended in the eyes 
of some, is no more open-ended than the project of originalist con-
stitutional interpretation.146 In both instances, judges run out of text 
and must discern constitutional norms from other sources.147 Hav-
ing addressed this, I return now to the principal discussion—that of 
decision rules and their constitutional basis. 
143 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of thermal imag-
ing technology on a private home is a search and thus is impermissible without a war-
rant). 
144 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–21 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts 
had standing to challenge the EPA’s regulation of carbon emissions). 
145 Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 68–75 (Illinois Pub. Law & Legal The-
ory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-24), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 (explaining why “the meaning discovered by 
constitutional interpretation [of text] runs out” and arguing that constitutional prac-
tice therefore requires the “supplementation” of constitutional text). 
146 Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive” 
Constitutional Rules, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2835, 2860 n.158 (2009) (arguing that judi-
cial creation of decision rules is no more threatening to democratic self-government 
than originalism because originalist judges must “inevitably extract from historical 
materials ‘the principles the ratifiers understood themselves’ and then ‘apply those 
principles to unforeseen circumstances’”) (quoting Robert H. Bork, Slouching To-
wards Miers, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A12). 
147 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 
857–60 (1989) (arguing that history and tradition should be studied to determine the 
proper application of constitutional text); Solum, supra note 145, at 75–79 (identifying 
several methods through which a judge might supplement textual meaning). 
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Although federal courts have an obligation to implement the 
Constitution through decision rules, it would be incorrect to say 
that each specific rule is the only permissible decision rule. In 
Miranda, for instance, it would have been perfectly acceptable for 
the Court to require suspects be informed that they have the “right 
to refuse to speak” rather than the “right to remain silent.”148 And 
for that matter, the Court could have decided not to create a per se 
rule, but rather to impose on the state the burden to disprove coer-
cion by clear and convincing evidence. One can debate whether 
this decision rule would be preferable to the Miranda rule, but 
there can be little debate that the Court clearly had the authority to 
impose such a rule. The point here is that there may exist multiple 
decision rules, any one of which can sufficiently implement consti-
tutional guarantees. Where multiple rules exist, the Court is free to 
choose among the competing rules. 
Given that federal courts may choose among competing rules, 
there is no reason why a court cannot select a rule designed by a 
non-Article III actor.149 Suppose that in 1968, two years after the 
Court issued Miranda, Congress amended the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to render inadmissible any confession not preceded by a 
series of warnings. Suppose further that the warnings promulgated 
by Congress were exactly the same as those ordered by the Court 
in Miranda itself, except that Congress adopted the phrase “right 
to refuse to speak” instead of “right to remain silent.” In a subse-
quent case, the Court would be free to replace its Miranda rule 
with the evidentiary rule designed by Congress. If the Court could 
re-design the rule on its own, there is nothing to prevent it from 
borrowing that design from some other entity.150 Of course, the 
148 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the per-
son must be warned that he has a right to remain silent . . . .”). The Court explicitly 
recognized this point in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989), stating that 
Miranda warnings need not “be given in the exact form described in that decision.” 
149 Indeed, the Miranda Court acknowledged this possibility when it invited “Con-
gress and the States to . . . search for . . . other procedures which are at least as effec-
tive [as Miranda warnings] in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in 
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
150 Professor Monaghan recognized this early on in his theory of constitutional com-
mon law. The “substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules” he de-
scribed, being sub-constitutional, was “subject to amendment, modification, or even 
reversal by Congress.” Monaghan, supra note 124, at 2–3. 
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Court may only borrow that other design if it would be sufficient to 
enforce the constitutional order. 
This hypothetical scenario is not completely fanciful, for Con-
gress did attempt to modify the Miranda rule in 1968. Unlike the 
hypothetical modification explained above, however, Congress 
sought to largely re-instate the “totality of circumstances” test that 
Miranda had displaced.151 Though the statute remained dormant for 
many years, it came before the Court in 2000 in Dickerson v. 
United States.152 In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
Court refused to implement the congressionally designed decision 
rule. Importantly, the problem was not that the totality of circum-
stances rule had originated with Congress,153 but that the rule was 
not an “adequate substitute for the warnings required by Miran-
da.”154 That is, the rule did not “meet the constitutional minimum” 
imposed by the Fifth Amendment.155 
Not only may Congress offer replacements for constitutional de-
cision rules; states may as well. Consider, for example, Smith v. 
Robbins.156 In Smith, the Court evaluated the procedures that a 
state-appointed defense attorney must follow in declining to file a 
frivolous appeal—procedures that the Court had previously out-
lined in Anders v. California.157 In Anders, the Court explained that, 
where a public defender has reviewed the record and found no 
ground justifying a non-frivolous appeal, he should inform the 
court of this by letter and the court should evaluate the merits of 
any putative appeal independently.158 In the Court’s view, such pro-
cedures were necessary to ensure that the defendant’s constitu-
tional right to counsel was not accidentally forfeited. After Anders, 
however, California developed its own set of procedures for public 
defenders who refused to file frivolous appeals. At issue in Smith 
151 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2000) (listing several factors to consider when evaluating the 
coerciveness of an interrogation and stating that the “presence or absence” of any fac-
tor “need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession”). 
152 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
153 Id. at 440–41 (stating that a “legislative alternative to Miranda” would be permis-
sible if it were “equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions”). 
154 Id. at 442. 
155 Id. 
156 528 U.S. 259 (2000). 
157 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
158 Id. at 744. 
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was the constitutionality of the California procedures, which in 
turn required the Court to assess the constitutional significance of 
the Anders procedures. The Court explained that “the Anders pro-
cedure is merely one method of satisfying the requirements of the 
Constitution for indigent criminal appeals”—that is, the Anders 
procedure is a decision rule.159 “The Constitution erects no barrier,” 
the Court explained, to states designing their own decisions rules 
and to the Court’s decision to give them effect.160 Finding that the 
California procedures “affor[ded] adequate and effective appellate 
review to indigent defendants,” the Court approved of the proce-
dures in place of those promulgated in Anders.161 
Thus, decision rules designed by Congress or the states can stand 
in the place of decision rules designed by the Court. This relation-
ship between the Court and non-judicial actors is most comfortable 
when the rule proffered by Congress or the states is more protec-
tive of individual rights than the Court’s decision rule. Thus, if 
Congress wishes to create a statutory right not to have one’s car 
searched during a traffic stop, persons deprived of this statutory 
right could press this right in court and not be thwarted by judi-
cially created decision rules holding that officers, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, may search cars in that setting.162 There 
will rarely be an objection to congressional preferences that aug-
ment individual rights. 
A more troublesome situation is presented, however, when Con-
gress or the states promulgate decision rules that provide less pro-
tection than judicially created decision rules. For example, suppose 
Congress enacted a law allowing federal officers to use thermal im-
aging devices to search private homes, provided that the officers 
are on public property during the search and have a reasonable 
suspicion that unlawful activity is afoot. This law would provide 
less protection than is currently available under the Fourth 
Amendment, since officers currently need probable cause to justify 
159 Smith, 528 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)). 
162 Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and 
probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus 
permits police to search the vehicle without more.”). 
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such a search.163 For those who believe that the Constitution’s 
meaning is simply a sum of judicial holdings, this law is patently 
unconstitutional. In contrast, for those who accept that decision 
rules are judicial creations that implement constitutional norms in 
one of several acceptable ways, this law is not necessarily unconsti-
tutional.164 Its validity does not depend on whether it provides less 
protection than a judicially created rule, but only on whether it 
would endanger the constitutional order. 
C. The Conditions Under Which Proxy Enforcement Will Be 
Acceptable 
Thus far, I have explained that federal courts have a duty to 
“implement” the Constitution by crafting doctrine that will make 
constitutional guarantees real.165 I have also explained that federal 
courts have a duty to obey the preferences of Congress with regard 
to direct or proxy enforcement, provided that Congress’ edicts are 
themselves constitutional.166 Finally, I have argued that implement-
ing rules devised by the Court are not properly understood as 
“constitutional” law and thus may be displaced by rules devised by 
Congress or the states, provided that those rules would in fact pro-
tect constitutional norms from erosion. These arguments thus 
make proxy enforcement contingent on two matters: (1) whether 
Congress has sanctioned the practice, and (2) whether the alterna-
tive rule will, in fact, uphold the constitutional order. In this Sec-
tion, I explain in detail how a court should determine whether 
these two conditions have been met. 
163 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of thermal imag-
ing technology on a private home is a search and is therefore impermissible without a 
warrant). 
164 See Berman, supra note 94, at 105 (explaining that “Congress might disagree 
with” a judicially created decision rule and “be moved to legislate” its own decision 
rule; in that case, the question “would then become whether to allow the judge-made 
decision rule to be replaced by the Congress-made one”). 
165 See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
166 See supra Subsection II.A.2. 
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1. Discerning Congressional Intent 
Congress enjoys plenary control over the federal courts and the 
enforcement of federal law.167 If Congress wants federal courts to 
enforce the Constitution directly, it may order them to do so. In 
contrast, if Congress desires that federal courts enforce sub-
constitutional law in place of constitutional law, it may also order 
courts to do so (provided that the sub-constitutional law maintains 
the constitutional order, a criterion I discuss in the following Sec-
tion). Thus, in determining whether to enforce the Constitution by 
proxy, federal courts must first discern congressional preferences. 
How should federal courts do this? Much in the same way that 
they discern any congressional preference—by reading the statute 
and applying standard rules of statutory interpretation. Thus, 
where Congress sanctions tort suits against federal officers and 
leaves unchanged the availability of Bivens actions, federal courts 
can reasonably infer that Congress remains comfortable with direct 
enforcement pursuant to Bivens.168 At the same time, it is impossi-
ble to read such a statute as commanding direct enforcement 
through Bivens. Federal courts are thus left with significant discre-
tion in these instances: Congress has not revealed a preference for 
proxy or direct enforcement, and federal courts are thus free to 
choose their own course. 
Divining congressional preferences in Section 1983 cases will 
work slightly differently. Clearly, in enacting Section 1983, Con-
167 Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (holding that Congress’ Article I power to 
create the lower federal courts implicitly includes the power to define their jurisdic-
tion). 
168 For instance, in amending the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1988, Congress 
exempted from FTCA coverage any claim “which is brought for a violation of the 
Constitution of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A). As this provision was 
explained in a report by the House Judiciary Committee: 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens, . . . the courts have identified this 
type of tort [as compared to a common law tort] as a more serious intrusion of 
the rights of an individual that merits special attention. Consequently, H.R. 
4612 would not affect the ability of victims of constitutional torts to seek per-
sonal redress from Federal employees who allegedly violate their Constitutional 
rights. 
H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, at 6 (1988). For a recent article assessing the status of Bivens 
in light of various congressional enactments, see James E. Pfander & David 
Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 Geo. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2009). 
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gress evinced a preference for direct enforcement. Indeed, a major 
impetus for the statute was the impotence of sub-constitutional law 
(specifically, state law) in protecting citizens from governmental 
overreaching.169 Despite its original preference for direct enforce-
ment, Congress is, of course, free to modify Section 1983 in favor 
of proxy enforcement in specific instances. Thus, if Congress 
wishes to set up a comprehensive regulatory scheme to address dis-
crimination in the school setting, it is free to modify Section 1983 
so that educational inequality is dealt with pursuant to a separate 
statute. Federal courts already have a relatively well-developed 
tool for assessing congressional goals in this regard. Courts ask 
whether “the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are suf-
ficiently comprehensive [so as to] demonstrate congressional intent 
to preclude” a Section 1983 action.170 Although any measure of 
congressional intent is likely to breed some disagreement, this test 
is relatively stable and is thus a useful way to sort out vexing prob-
lems of congressional intent arising from congressional silence.171 
Further, this test appropriately ignores state law in interpreting 
congressional preferences for or against direct enforcement 
through Section 1983. While a federal statute can be read as an im-
plied modification of another federal statute, state law cannot be 
read in this way because, quite obviously, state and federal laws is-
sue from different sovereigns.172 
2. Preserving Constitutional Order 
If Congress opens the door to proxy enforcement—either by 
specifically ordering it or tacitly allowing it—federal courts must 
169 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution 1863–1877, at 454–
59 (1988). 
170 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 
(1981) (refusing to enforce federal maritime statutes though a § 1983 suit); see also 
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983) (holding Bivens action unavailable because of 
congressional enactment of “comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions 
giving meaningful remedies”); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 346–48 (1997) 
(permitting § 1983 suits for relief under portions of the Social Security Act that do not 
provide comprehensive remedies). 
171 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 796–97 (2009) (un-
animous opinion applying this test). 
172 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765–66 (1985) (discussing the princi-
ples under which one federal statute will be read as impliedly modifying an earlier-
enacted statute). 
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then determine whether the sub-constitutional law to be applied 
will indeed preserve the constitutional order. In making this de-
termination, federal courts should focus on three factors: the pro-
cedures attending sub-constitutional enforcement, the substance of 
the sub-constitutional law, and the remedies available pursuant to 
it. 
Procedures. It is hardly novel to note that procedures affect re-
sults. Indeed, over seventy years ago, the chief drafter of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure referred to procedure as the “Hand-
maid of Justice.”173 Thus, in determining whether sub-constitutional 
law will produce sufficient results, federal courts should evaluate 
the entire procedural context in which enforcement will occur. This 
includes an inquiry into the formal procedures used, as well as a 
more holistic assessment as to whether enforcement, on the whole, 
is likely to be accomplished. This evaluation will be the most 
searching where sub-constitutional adjudication will occur outside 
an Article III court, since cases that occur in a federal court are ad-
judicated using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—rules that 
are presumptively adequate.174 In these situations, the procedures 
and overall context need not be identical to those in federal court, 
but they must, on the whole, be sufficient to vindicate basic consti-
tutional standards. 
Federal courts are often called upon to make this determination, 
as the recent case of Boumediene v. Bush illustrates.175 The issue in 
Boumediene was whether prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay 
173 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 Wash. U. L.Q. 297 (1938); see also 
Mirjan R. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Ap-
proach to the Legal Process 148 (1986) (“[P]rocedure is basically a handmaiden of 
substantive law.”). 
174 The instances where proxy enforcement cases will occur in state court are rare. 
Suits against federal officers, even if filed in state court, will almost always end up in 
federal court because federal officers have a statutory right to remove the case to fed-
eral court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442. While a sub-constitutional law action against a state offi-
cer will likely end up in state court (save diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332), proxy enforcement will rarely be permissible in these cases since § 1983 
evinces a preference for direct enforcement without regard to state law. See supra 
note 172 and accompanying text. Thus, proxy suits most likely to be adjudicated out-
side an Article III court are those that must be originally filed in a federal administra-
tive tribunal. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 367 (ordering federal employee to file First 
Amendment claim in administrative, rather than Article III, court). 
175 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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could seek relief through petitions for habeas corpus in light of 
Congress’ attempt to foreclose such efforts in the Detainee Treat-
ment Act (DTA). Although Congress is free to curtail habeas relief 
in various respects,176 the resulting remedial apparatus must be 
“neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s 
detention.”177 The Boumediene Court was thus charged with deter-
mining whether Congress’ replacement procedures were an “ade-
quate substitute” for standard habeas procedures.178 Five justices 
held that they were not. The DTA procedures, regardless of 
whether they “satisf[ied] due process standards,” created a “con-
siderable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact.”179 Detain-
ees were assigned not a lawyer, but rather a “Personal Representa-
tive” who was not considered an “advocate”; the government’s 
evidence was “accorded a presumption of validity”; the “circum-
stances [surrounding the detainee’s] confinement” limited “his 
ability to rebut the Government’s evidence against him”; and the 
appellate review process could not “cure all defects in the earlier 
proceedings.”180 For these reasons, the Court held that the DTA 
procedures were an inadequate substitute for a formal habeas cor-
pus petition. 
Boumediene is instructive on the issue of procedural adequacy in 
two respects. First, it highlights assorted criteria that will affect the 
adequacy of a procedural system in protecting the constitutional 
order. Second, it illustrates that a procedural system can be inade-
quate even though the procedures comport with due process doc-
trine.181 Boumediene contemplates, and properly so, a broad-
ranging inquiry into how the overall context of adjudication will af-
fect results. This aspect of Boumediene is also nicely illustrated by 
the landmark case of Ex parte Young.182 In Young, the Court al-
lowed railroad employees to seek an injunction in federal courts 
176 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
177 Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977). 
178 128 S.Ct. at 2662–63. This question necessarily followed the Court’s prior conclu-
sion that the right to habeas corpus relief “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” Id. 
179 Id. at 2270. 
180 Id. at 2260. 
181 Id. at 2270 (“Even if we were to assume that the CSRTs satisfy due process stan-
dards, it would not end our inquiry.”). 
182 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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against the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state stat-
ute. Although the employees could challenge the statute in state 
court by first violating the statute and then asserting its unconstitu-
tionality as a defense, the federal courts found this prospect unreal-
istic. The statute ordered that violators “be punished by a fine not 
exceeding five thousand ($5,000) dollars, or by imprisonment in the 
state prison for a period not exceeding five (5) years, or both such 
fine and imprisonment.”183 Few employees would risk such harsh 
penalties to test the constitutionality of the law, with the effect that 
the penalties “close[d] up all approaches to the courts, and . . . pre-
vent[ed] any hearing upon the question.”184 Thus, although the as-
sertion of a defense might normally be procedurally adequate to 
enforce constitutional standards,185 the special context surrounding 
Ex parte Young made this likelihood remote. A civil rights action 
in federal court was necessary. 
Thus, in assessing the procedural sufficiency of a proxy enforce-
ment system, the court should pay attention to standard indicia of 
procedural fairness as well as other contextual issues that may, as a 
practical matter, impede the vindication of the constitutional norm 
at issue. 
Substance. The substance of sub-constitutional law will also af-
fect whether the constitutional order will be preserved. To assess 
whether the sub-constitutional law will be substantively adequate 
to the task of preserving the constitutional order, courts should fo-
cus first on whether liability is triggered by the sub-constitutional 
law. For instance, tort law, inasmuch as it forbids police officers 
from beating suspects during an arrest, will be triggered, and is thus 
substantively sufficient to maintain the constitutional order. At the 
same time, government contract law would be wholly impotent to 
protect citizens from police brutality and thus would be an unac-
ceptable proxy. 
Where liability would be triggered under both the constitutional 
and sub-constitutional law, the sub-constitutional law will be (at 
183 Id. at 128. 
184 Id. at 148. 
185 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49–54 (1971) (holding a § 1983 action to be un-
available while a state criminal action was pending because the state procedures—
including the ability to raise a constitutional right as a defense—were adequate to 
protect the defendant’s rights). 
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least from a substantive perspective) an adequate replacement for 
the constitutional decision rule. If liability is not triggered, how-
ever, the federal courts should not immediately dismiss the possi-
bility of proxy enforcement. This point owes to the fact that consti-
tutional decision rules are not “constitutional” law in a formal 
sense, but simply judicial creations used to implement constitu-
tional norms. If federal courts have the authority to modify these 
decision rules (which, given the ambiguous and open-ended nature 
of the constitutional text, they quite often do), federal courts are 
free to replace their own rules with those devised by non-Article 
III actors.186 
Thus, if liability is not triggered under the sub-constitutional law, 
the question becomes whether the alternative decision rule is sub-
stantively adequate to maintain the constitutional order. A sub-
constitutional law that covers ninety-nine percent of the police bru-
tality cases brought under the Fourth Amendment will quite likely 
continue to preserve Fourth Amendment norms. Suppose, for in-
stance, that the tort law of a particular state recognizes a narrow 
defense to liability for battery where the defendant’s imposition of 
force was based on the mistaken identity of the victim. This de-
fense will likely defeat some tort claims based on police brutality, 
but it is difficult to believe that police officers, or the police de-
partments that train them, will dispense with adherence to Fourth 
Amendment norms. Federal courts could thus apply a proxy en-
forcement rule in those situations, even if it meant that some vic-
tims of police brutality (that is, those abused based on a mistaken 
identity) will not receive relief. Importantly, however, courts would 
be free to revisit the advisability of proxy enforcement in this situa-
tion. If the invocation of the mistaken identity defense increased 
dramatically such that the boundaries between the state and its 
citizens were effectively shifted, proxy enforcement could, and 
should, be ended. 
I recognize that courts may find it challenging to determine the 
extent of overlap between constitutional and sub-constitutional 
law, and further, whether something less than complete overlap 
will protect constitutional norms. This point, however, speaks to 
the normative desirability of a specific rule of proxy enforcement 
186 See supra Section II.B. 
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and not to the practice’s overall permissibility. Moreover, as noted 
above, federal courts are constantly called on to consider whether a 
doctrinal rule will adequately implement constitutional norms.187 
Thus, while open-ended and susceptible to bald value judgments, 
this type of decisionmaking is hardly foreign to the federal judicial 
role in constitutional cases. 
Finally, it should be noted that sub-constitutional law will some-
times sweep more broadly than constitutional doctrine. For in-
stance, one of the chief barriers to relief in any civil rights action is 
the qualified immunity defense, which precludes recovery in cases 
where the officer “does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”188 This defense is often unavailable in tort suits against 
governments, however, meaning that plaintiffs will recover when 
their rights were in fact violated, regardless of whether the rights 
were clearly established.189 Thus, in a police brutality case, a plain-
tiff is likely to collect damages under tort much more often than 
under the Fourth Amendment, even though both laws, on their 
face, prohibit brutality. In these cases, proxy enforcement would be 
a net gain for plaintiffs.190 
Remedies. Finally, a court presented with a proxy decision 
should also focus on the remedies provided by the alternative law. 
187 See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
188 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see generally Alan K. Chen, The 
Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 
81 Iowa L. Rev. 261 (1995) (explaining official immunity analysis in constitutional tort 
cases); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public 
Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 Geo. L.J. 65, 65–66, 79–80 (1999) (ex-
plaining that Bivens suits rarely result in an assessment of damages and that 
“[q]ualified immunity is undoubtedly the most significant bar” to recovery). 
189 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (imposing liability on the United States “under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the [negligent or wrongful] act 
or omission occurred”); United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) (stating that, 
because “the United States waives sovereign immunity ‘under circumstances’ where 
local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort,” any official or municipal im-
munity created by state law is not applicable in FTCA suits against the federal gov-
ernment). 
190 To be sure, this gain will only be realized by plaintiffs alleging constitutional, but 
not common law, claims. For plaintiffs bringing both sub-constitutional and constitu-
tional claims, no net gain will be realized. While many litigants bring common law 
claims with their constitutional claims, a large number of litigants do not—especially 
prisoners. See, e.g., Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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To be sure, the issue of remedies can sometimes be cast in proce-
dural or substantive terms, since the ultimate relief a plaintiff may 
obtain is undoubtedly affected by both procedure and substance. 
Yet, there will be issues that fall solely into the remedial domain. 
Damages caps are the best example. Although punitive damages 
are a standard feature of state tort law, they are typically unavail-
able in tort claims against the federal and state governments.191 
Similarly, state common law employment discrimination claims are 
often governed by standard damages doctrine,192 whereas damages 
for employment discrimination by public agencies are often 
capped.193 Limitations on damages, however, need not be fatal to 
proxy enforcement. As with the procedural and substantive inquir-
ies, the question is not whether the relief available under an alter-
native law is equal to, or greater than, that available in a civil rights 
action, but simply whether the alternative relief is sufficient to 
maintain the minimum constitutional order. As noted, courts have 
ample resources to make this determination and are free to revisit 
the issue should their initial determination prove incorrect. 
D. Illustrations 
Having justified the use of proxy enforcement under certain 
conditions, I now make these arguments concrete by applying them 
to several different cases. 
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee.194 In Fitzgerald, the 
parents of an elementary school student brought an Equal Protec-
tion claim against a school district under Section 1983. The com-
plaint alleged that the district failed to prevent student-on-student 
sexual harassment, thus denying the student equal protection of 
the laws. The school district argued that the parents’ Section 1983 
191 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions 
of this title relating to tort claims, . . . but shall not be liable . . . for punitive dam-
ages.”); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 31 (1983) (affirming the award of punitive dam-
ages in a § 1983 action); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (stating that “puni-
tive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit”). 
192 See, e.g., Niblo v. Parr Mfg., 445 N.W.2d 351, 355–56 (Iowa 1989) (holding that 
the remedy for wrongful discharge covers the “complete injury,” including economic 
loss such as wages and out-of-pocket expenses, as well as emotional harm). 
193  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (capping damages at either $50,000; $100,000; $200,000; 
or $300,000, depending on the size of the defendant-employer). 
194  129 S. Ct. 788 (2009). 
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claim was precluded because Title IX was the exclusive avenue for 
addressing the wrongs alleged. 
As set out above, proxy enforcement though Title IX will be 
permissible if Congress has ordered so (or at least, through its si-
lence, left that possibility open) and Title IX will maintain a suffi-
cient degree of equality so that equal protection norms will not be-
come a nullity. In Fitzgerald, proxy enforcement is inappropriate 
because Title IX cannot be read, implicitly or explicitly, as with-
drawing access to Section 1983. In enacting Title IX, Congress did 
not create a private right of action similar to that created in Section 
1983; instead, Congress’ chosen method of enforcing Title IX was 
the withdrawal of federal funding.195 This suggests that Congress 
did not intend to displace the private right of action in Section 
1983. Thus, regardless of whether Title IX would maintain suffi-
cient equality, proxy enforcement is inappropriate because it con-
tradicts Congress’ choice on the matter. 
Monroe v. Pape. Monroe presents a similar issue to that in Fitz-
gerald, except that Monroe involves the role of state law, rather 
than a federal statute. The facts of Monroe, discussed above,196 
should be familiar. Thirteen Chicago police officers, without a war-
rant or other justification, entered James Monroe’s home and ar-
rested him. Monroe, together with his wife, brought suit under Sec-
tion 1983 for a violation of their constitutional rights. The 
defendants argued that the Monroes should have brought their 
claims under state tort law, not the Constitution. The Court re-
jected this invitation to enforce the Constitution by proxy. 
The Court’s decision was correct. In enacting Section 1983, Con-
gress ordered federal courts to issue relief to any plaintiff who has 
suffered a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution.”197 There is no hint in Section 1983 that 
its availability depends on the nonexistence of relief under state 
195 Although a private cause of action does exist to enforce Title IX, the cause of ac-
tion is judicially implied. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). 
As such, the existence of the action says little about congressional preferences on en-
forcement. Fitzgerald, 129 S. Ct. at 796 (“Title IX contains no express private rem-
edy . . . . This Court has never held that an implied right of action had the effect of 
precluding suit under § 1983, likely because of the difficulty of discerning congres-
sional intent in such a situation.”). 
196 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
197 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
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law; as noted above, Section 1983 was specifically enacted to create 
an avenue of relief irrespective of state law.198 Therefore, in Mon-
roe, the Supreme Court was correct to follow Congress’ choice and 
ignore the state law. Monroe thus illustrates that state law will 
rarely, if ever, be an adequate stand-in for a Section 1983 action. 
Unlike a federal statute that can be interpreted as an implied re-
peal of Section 1983,199 state law can never be invoked to interpret 
congressional objectives regarding the availability of Section 1983. 
Bush v. Lucas.200 In Bush, an employee of the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA) publicly criticized the 
agency on several occasions. As a result of these statements, the 
employee was demoted. Thereafter, the employee brought a 
Bivens action seeking damages for a violation of his First Amend-
ment right to free expression. The federal government argued that 
the plaintiff’s remedy lay not in a Bivens action, but under the Civil 
Service Reform Act (CSRA), a federal statute providing for the 
resolution of employment disputes (including First Amendment 
claims) between the federal government and its employees. 
Under the framework explained above, proxy enforcement is 
likely inappropriate in this case. The problem lies not with congres-
sional intent regarding proxy enforcement,201 the substance of the 
alternative law,202 or with its remedial force,203 but rather with the 
198 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
199 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 
19–21 (1981) (interpreting federal maritime statutes as impliedly foreclosing use of 
§ 1983 as an enforcement mechanism). 
200 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
201 The statutory scheme evinces no clear preference for or against proxy enforce-
ment. Id. at 373 (“Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy that 
petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Congress has not expressly pre-
cluded the creation of such a remedy by declaring that existing statutes provide the 
exclusive mode of redress.”). Thus, the recognition of a Bivens action is open to the 
discretion of the court. See supra Subsection III.C.1. 
202 In this instance, Bush’s claims would be adjudicated under First Amendment law, 
not under a statute creating speech rights. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 386 (noting that the 
“First Amendment claims raised by petitioner . . . are fully cognizable within [the 
statutory] system”). Thus, as the substance of the legal standard will be the same in 
both circumstances, there can be no concern over a substantive variation. 
203 Under the statutory scheme, plaintiffs are eligible to receive remedies similar, but 
not identical, to those in Bivens actions. Id. at 388 (describing remedies that will “put 
the employee in the same position he would have been in had the unjustified or erro-
neous personnel action not taken place”) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). Although punitive and emotional distress damages are not available, it is 
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procedural aspects of the alternative enforcement. A recent study 
of First Amendment claims by federal employees suggests that the 
“administrative scheme [utilized in such cases] is not vindicating 
the First Amendment . . . rights of federal employees.”204 The study 
makes a “startling” finding: in the entire history of the statutory 
review process, “not a single First Amendment . . . claim filed by a 
federal employee against the employee’s agency has ever been suc-
cessful on the merits.”205 The study traces this result to the “lack of 
neutrality and competency” in the administrative officers charged 
with hearing such cases, as well as the absence of “meaningful judi-
cial review by an Article III court.”206 First Amendment claims fail 
under the CSRA, it seems, because CSRA procedures—not the 
laws applied or the remedies issued—are insufficient to deliver re-
lief. As such, the federal courts may not rely on the CSRA process 
to vindicate First Amendment rights and instead must allow liti-
gants to make use of Bivens actions. 
Wilson v. Libby.207 In Wilson, Valerie Plame and her husband, 
Joseph Wilson, brought a Bivens action against Vice President 
Cheney; his chief of staff, “Scooter” Libby; Richard Armitage of 
the State Department; and Karl Rove, top advisor to the President. 
The wrongful act for which the couple sued was the deliberate 
leaking of Plame’s status as a covert agent for the CIA. This act, 
the couple alleged, infringed upon their rights of free speech, pri-
vacy, property, and equal protection. The defendants argued that, 
regardless of whether the leak constituted a constitutional viola-
tion, the couple’s remedy lay under the federal Privacy Act, not the 
Constitution through a Bivens action. 
The D.C. Court of Appeals recently sided with the defendants. 
This decision is likely wrong because the substance of the Privacy 
unlikely that this substantially affects the deterrent force of the remedial system. As 
noted above, the qualified immunity defense does not apply in these cases, thus mean-
ing that the statutory scheme will, on the whole, provide remedial force that meets or 
exceeds a Bivens action. See supra notes 188–190 and accompanying text. 
204 Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 1101, 1103 (2008). 
205 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
206 Id. at 1139. 
207 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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Act (rather than it procedures208 or remedies,209 or any congres-
sional intent underlying the Act210) is insufficient to protect the 
constitutional norms invoked by the plaintiffs. At first glance, the 
Privacy Act may seem substantively sufficient. It forbids the disclo-
sure of information “about an individual”211 under circumstances 
that, in this case at least, would be unconstitutional.212 Yet there is a 
glaring hole in the substantive law in this case: the Privacy Act does 
not apply to the Offices of the President and Vice President.213 
Thus, the only defendant arguably liable under the Privacy Act 
would be Richard Armitage. It is difficult to believe that the Presi-
dent and the Vice President, together with their entire staffs, could 
be deterred from transgressing constitutional norms by holding 
their confederates from other agencies liable under the Privacy 
Act.214 
208 Privacy Act claims may be adjudicated in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
Thus, the procedures available in a Privacy Act claim will be the exact same proce-
dures as those available in a federal court constitutional action. Further, there is no 
indication that the larger context of the adjudication will systematically prevent en-
forcement. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
209 Victims of Privacy Act violations are entitled to “actual damages” as well as the 
“the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) 
(2006). 
210 There is no indication in the Privacy Act that Congress intended to displace the 
Bivens action. Thus, the decision to adopt proxy enforcement in this instance is en-
tirely within the province of the courts. 
211 5 U.S.C. § 552a(4)–(5) (2006). 
212 The D.C. Circuit correctly observed this as well. See Wilson, 535 F.3d at 707 
(“Each claim in the Wilson complaint is based on . . . disclosure of Privacy Act pro-
tected information. . . . Thus, each Constitutional claim, whether pled in terms of pri-
vacy, property, due process, or the First Amendment, is a claim alleging damages 
from the improper disclosure of information covered by the Privacy Act.”). 
213 The Privacy Act applies to agencies, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006), and under the 
Act an agency is defined by reference to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (2006). FOIA, in turn, does not apply to the offices of President 
or Vice President. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 
U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (holding that the Office of the President is not an “agency” pur-
suant to FOIA); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. 
Supp. 2d 20, 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that the Office of the Vice President is not an 
“agency” under FOIA). 
214 It might be argued that holding confederates liable will dissuade violations by 
those in the  Executive Office of the President (EOP) and the Executive Office of the 
Vice President (EOVP) because confederates will thereafter be less likely to assist in 
the transgressions. But this claim is dubious for two reasons. First, it seems likely that 
the EOP and EOVP will always be able to find willing confederates to carry out their 
plans, and second, that they will often not need any confederates. The plan in this 
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Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.215 In Malesko, the Court 
considered an Eighth Amendment claim by a prisoner against a 
federal halfway house. After suffering a heart attack, the plaintiff 
brought a Bivens action alleging that the prison corporation failed 
to take account of his fragile medical condition. That failure, al-
leged the plaintiff, amounted to “deliberate indifference” and thus 
was an Eighth Amendment violation.216 The Supreme Court re-
jected this claim. In its view, a Bivens action was unnecessary be-
cause the plaintiff “enjoy[ed] a parallel tort remedy.”217 The Court 
suggested that this remedy lay in some type of “ordinary negli-
gence” claim against the prison.218 
A tort suit against a prison in this circumstance is likely a per-
missible avenue of constitutional enforcement. There is no indica-
tion that Congress has disapproved of enforcement by proxy here, 
and the procedures applicable to the tort action, whether the suit is 
brought in state or federal court, will be traditional adjudicatory 
procedures.219 Moreover, the applicable law is, in fact, more protec-
tive of rights than the constitutional standard. A prison will be li-
case could have been fully executed without the participation of Richard Armitage. 
That is, Plame’s covert status could have been leaked to Robert Novak directly by 
Scooter Libby or any other member of the EOP or EOVP. In this sense, it is difficult 
to conclude that Privacy Act claims for the misconduct alleged are an adequate tool 
for keeping government within bounds. 
215 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
216 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (promulgating a deliberate indif-
ference standard). 
217 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72–73. 
218 Id. 
219 One could challenge the efficacy of state court adjudication by arguing that state 
courts are less willing to enforce the rights of marginalized individuals than federal 
courts. The force of this argument—first presented in Burt Neuborne, The Myth of 
Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1120–21 (1977)—has been undercut, however, by nu-
merous empirical studies. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1457, 1491–94 (2005) (reviewing empirical literature on the sub-
ject). For this reason, normative assessments of federal jurisdiction and practice in-
creasingly ignore the issue of parity. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsid-
ered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 236 (1988) 
(seeking to “define a role for the federal courts without evaluating the comparative 
abilities of the federal and state courts in constitutional cases”); Barry Friedman, Un-
der the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State 
Courts, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211, 1214, 1221 (2004) (dismissing reliance on parity in 
allocating cases between federal and state courts because scholars “will never resolve 
the either-or problem,” that is, “the common assumption . . . that cases must be liti-
gated either in federal court or in state court”). 
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able in tort for failing to protect a prisoner from harm if the failure 
was negligent.220 In contrast, a prison will be liable under the Eighth 
Amendment for failing to protect a prisoner only if the failure was 
reckless—“a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.”221 
Thus, there can be no objection to enforcement by proxy based on 
the substantive content of the alternative law. Finally, as to the 
remedies available, a tort action against the prison will typically 
make available to the plaintiff the standard remedies (compensa-
tory and punitive damages) that would be available in a constitu-
tional tort action.222 Thus, proxy enforcement was permissible in 
Malesko. 
Carlson v. Green.223 Carlson is similar to Malesko in several re-
spects: it is an Eighth Amendment claim brought by a prisoner 
against a prison. The key difference between the two cases, how-
ever, is that the prison in Malesko was a privately operated prison, 
whereas the prison in Carlson was run by the federal government. 
Thus, a tort action against the prison in Malesko would have pro-
ceeded entirely under state tort law, while a tort action in Carlson 
would have proceeded under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA).224 This is important because the FTCA, unlike most state 
tort laws, does not allow punitive damages.225 Thus, determining 
whether proxy enforcement is appropriate in Carlson requires one 
to determine the importance of punitive damages in maintaining 
Eighth Amendment norms. There can be no objection to proxy en-
220 See Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 41 cmt. f (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 314A(2) (1965); 
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, §§ 323–28 (2000); see also Brownelli v. 
McCaughtry, 514 N.W.2d 48, 50–51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that an inmate had 
a claim against a prison employee who negligently failed to provide medical assis-
tance); Breaux v. State, 326 So. 2d 481, 483 (La. 1976) (holding that prison officials 
had a duty to protect a prisoner being attacked by another inmate); Taylor v. Slaugh-
ter, 42 P.2d 235, 236–37 (Okla. 1935) (holding that a jailor was obliged to protect a 
prisoner from harm at the hands of other prisoners). 
221 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). 
222 See, e.g., Adams v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 187 P.3d 1190, 1198 (Colo. App. 2008). 
223 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
224 Although independent contractors may be government actors for the purposes of 
the Constitution, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54–57 (1988), they are not covered by 
the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006). 
225 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the 
provisions of this title relating to tort claims . . . but shall not be liable . . . for punitive 
damages.”). 
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forcement on other grounds, such as the preference of Congress on 
the matter, the procedure attending the sub-constitutional litiga-
tion, and the substance of the sub-constitutional law.226 
This is a difficult question because punitive damages are specifi-
cally designed to have a deterrent effect, and deterrence is the 
chief role of the constitutional tort action.227 Because of this, one 
might expect the unavailability of punitive damages to weaken the 
deterrent effect of an FTCA action significantly. This may be true, 
but it depends on the actual availability of punitive damages in civil 
rights actions generally. As it turns out, punitive damages are 
available in theory more than in practice. They are not available 
against counties and municipalities,228 nor available for conduct that 
is less than reckless or intentional.229 In this way, the civil rights ac-
tion, which is presumed to have deterrent effect, has proceeded in 
large measure without its chief deterrent tool—punitive damages. 
Assuming that the current structure of civil rights remedies ade-
quately maintains Eighth Amendment standards,230 it is quite pos-
sible to conclude that tort suits providing only compensatory dam-
ages will be a sufficient replacement for civil rights actions. This 
inference is bolstered by the fact that the defense of qualified im-
munity is not available in FTCA suits.231 Thus, while the maximum 
damages award in an FTCA action is likely to be smaller than in a 
226 Congress has signified its comfort with the availability of Bivens actions for harms 
that could also be remedied under the FTCA. See supra note 170. Because FTCA 
claims must be litigated in federal court, the procedures applicable can be considered 
presumptively adequate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). Carlson’s Eighth 
Amendment claims were premised on inadequate medical care and would thus give 
rise to liability under the FTCA for medical malpractice. See, e.g., Hannah v. United 
States, 523 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 2008) (adjudicating an FTCA claim by a prisoner 
for substandard medical treatment received in prison). 
227 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (“[T]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the 
officer.”). 
228 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). 
229 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 
230 I recognize that this is a questionable assumption. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Puni-
tive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 La. L. Rev. 841, 841 (1996) (arguing that 
the Supreme Court’s current punitive damage doctrine in constitutional tort cases is 
inadequate). Yet, the value of punitive damages generally is a question separate from 
what I address here: whether proxy enforcement is permissible in light of the current 
shape of civil rights doctrine. 
231 See supra notes 188–190 and accompanying text. 
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Bivens or Section 1983 action, the average FTCA award is likely to 
be larger, resulting in adequate deterrence. 
Schweiker v. Chilicky.232 Chilicky was an action by three indi-
viduals regarding the wrongful denial of Social Security disability 
payments. Using an administrative review process created by Con-
gress, all three individuals were able to recoup their improperly 
denied payments. Despite this, the plaintiffs brought a Bivens ac-
tion seeking damages for “emotional distress and for loss of food, 
shelter and other necessities proximately caused by [the govern-
ment’s] denial of benefits without due process.”233 The Court re-
fused to recognize a Bivens action because “Congress . . . provided 
what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional 
violations.”234 
The Court was correct to adopt a system of proxy enforcement 
in Chilicky. First, the statutory scheme suggests a congressional 
preference for proxy enforcement, since Congress created an 
elaborate system for determining the proper disability payments. 
Even if one sees this as less than clear, there is no indication that 
Congress preferred direct enforcement, thus leaving proxy en-
forcement open to judicial discretion. Second, there is no indica-
tion that the statutory scheme is procedurally inadequate to pro-
vide the appropriate remedies to claimants.235 Third, the substance 
of the constitutional and sub-constitutional law is the same because 
liability under either law will hinge on the availability of disability 
benefits under the Social Security Act. And finally, the remedies 
available under the statutory scheme are likely sufficient to prevent 
improper denials. While it is true that relief for emotional distress 
is unavailable under the statutory scheme, it is unlikely that the 
lack of damages for emotional distress, applicable only to a narrow 
category of cases, will lower substantive due process rights below 
an acceptable threshold. While this assessment appears correct in 
the two decades since Chilicky, the Court is, of course, free to re-
visit it should subsequent events or research reveal the statutory 
scheme to be inadequate. 
232 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
233 Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
234 Id. at 423. 
235 In fact, a specific goal of the statutory scheme was to improve prior procedures 
deemed to be flawed. Id. at 423–26. 
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Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale.236 In Johnson, a black em-
ployee brought suit against the Fort Lauderdale Fire Department 
for discrimination on the basis of his race. He alleged that the De-
partment violated his rights under Title VII and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. At issue in the case was whether he could maintain an 
Equal Protection claim using Section 1983 given the availability of 
relief through Title VII. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff 
could pursue his constitutional claim because Title VII did not 
“preempt[] a constitutional cause of action under [Section] 1983.”237 
Contrary to the court’s opinion, however, proxy enforcement in 
Johnson was likely permissible. As a preliminary matter, the con-
gressional enactment of Title VII can be read as an implied prohi-
bition on public employment Section 1983 cases, thus opening the 
door to proxy enforcement.238 Next, there are no formal procedures 
or informal contextual matters that would render Title VII, as com-
pared to Section 1983, ineffectual in preventing discrimination in 
public employment. The cases can be litigated in federal court, and 
plaintiffs thus have access to the full procedural tools and inde-
pendence inherent in that tribunal.239 With regard to substance, 
236 148 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1998). 
237 Id. at 1231. 
238 I recognize that many courts have taken the opposite view. See, e.g., Booth v. 
Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff may bring dis-
crimination claims against municipal employers under both Title VII and the Equal 
Protection Clause via § 1983). This view, however, contradicts numerous other areas 
in which comprehensive statutory schemes have been deemed to be an implied repeal 
of § 1983 actions. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127 
(2005) (holding that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 because the Act itself provides the sole remedy); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 
184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (denying a § 1983 action to enforce the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because the ADA impliedly foreclosed ac-
cess to § 1983); Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364, 1366–71 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) pro-
vided an exclusive remedial scheme). As the Court has recently explained in the Title 
IX area, Congress can be presumed to “displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional 
rights” where it creates statutory “rights and protections” that are similar to the rights 
and protections available under § 1983. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. 
Ct. 788, 794 (2009). The rights and remedies available under Title VII are similar to 
those available at the time Title VII was enacted. Thus, contrary to the majority view 
in these cases, congressional intent does not foreclose proxy enforcement in this area. 
239 While it is true that Title VII claimants must first exhaust available administrative 
remedies, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006), there is little reason to think that this ex-
haustion requirement renders the law ineffectual at controlling discrimination. If one 
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there can be little objection to Title VII as a stand-in for Equal 
Protection law, since Title VII prohibits public employers from 
“discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”240 Finally, 
where remedies are concerned, Title VII is likely sufficient to deter 
unconstitutional discrimination. Successful Section 1983 claimants 
can obtain compensatory and punitive damages, both of which are 
available under Title VII.241 Although Title VII caps compensatory 
and punitive damages between $50,000 and $300,000 (depending 
on the number of persons employed by the defendant-employer),242 
these caps do not apply to back-pay and attorney’s fees,243 which 
can be quite substantial. These amounts, it is fair to presume, pro-
cure substantial compliance with the law. To argue otherwise, one 
must argue that Title VII is ineffectual at controlling discrimination 
throughout the entire private sector, since Title VII applies there 
too.244 Although courts considering proxy enforcement should be 
open to empirical studies suggesting otherwise, a court considering 
this issue today could reasonably conclude that Title VII is a fair 
proxy for an Equal Protection action in the public employment 
context. 
III. IS PROXY ENFORCEMENT DESIRABLE? 
In Part II, I identified the instances where federal courts may 
enforce the Constitution through sub-constitutional law. While this 
defines the practice as permissible in certain instances, it does not 
deems Title VII cases effective in the private sphere (a reasonable assumption), there 
is no reason to think that they suddenly become insufficient in the public sphere. 
240 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
241 Although Title VII only allows punitive damages for intentional discrimination, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006), Equal Protection doctrine only recognizes a viola-
tion where the discrimination was intentional. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
238–48 (1976). Thus, where an Equal Protection violation has been committed, puni-
tive damages will be available in a Title VII suit. 
242 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006). 
243 The cost of an adverse judgment to a defendant in a Title VII case is the sum of 
the damages awarded, the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, and the defendant’s own attor-
ney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006) (granting the court discretion to allow 
prevailing plaintiffs to collect reasonable attorney’s fees from the defendants). 
244 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (imposing liability on any “employer,” which “means 
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employ-
ees”). 
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resolve another important issue: whether the practice is desirable. 
On the one hand, it is quite possible that enforcement by proxy, 
though a permissible practice from a constitutional perspective, is 
nonetheless undesirable from a normative perspective because it 
sacrifices important values, apart from keeping government within 
the bounds of constitutional norms. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that enforcement by proxy sacrifices no values and instead 
creates new value. In this Part, I consider the desirability of proxy 
enforcement aside from its constitutional permissibility. 
I explain that proxy enforcement will be desirable only where 
the alternative law is federal in nature. I reach this conclusion by 
considering several normative values implicated by the practice, in-
cluding shared constitutional interpretation, constitutional devel-
opment, constitutional expression, and administrative efficiency. In 
short, proxy enforcement using a federal statute (or rarely, federal 
common law) allows for shared constitutional interpretation and 
does not frustrate other important interests. In contrast, proxy en-
forcement using state tort law, while allowing states a role in con-
stitutional implementation, will impose significant practical costs 
on federal courts. I conclude this Part by briefly reviewing the 
cases where proxy enforcement is permissible and indentifying 
which of those cases are fit, normatively speaking, for proxy en-
forcement. 
A. Sharing the Constitution with Congress 
A central obsession of modern constitutional theory is the ques-
tion of interpretive supremacy—who should control the meaning 
of the Constitution?245 Though the views of scholars and judges on 
this issue can be mapped any number of ways, it is possible to chart 
most views somewhere along a continuum that stretches between 
“judicial supremacy” and “popular constitutionalism.” These ideo-
logical endpoints, like poles on a magnet, are intensely repellant to 
each other. Commentators of all persuasions have expended great 
effort justifying one view to the exclusion of the other, or instead 
245 See Friedman, supra note 16, at 159 (stating that the “academic obsession with 
the countermajoritarian problem” is the “result of historical, professional, and intel-
lectual forces that, as a cultural matter, simply were unavoidable for many academics 
(even though they seemed to matter little to those beyond the professorate)”). 
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reconciling both views to each other, with little success. Constitu-
tional enforcement by proxy, however, offers a partial solution. As 
explained below, it allows courts to uphold core constitutional val-
ues by holding government officials accountable for transgressing 
constitutional norms, while simultaneously giving effect to the 
views expressed by the electorate. 
1. Judicial Supremacy 
Modern judicial supremacy was born in Cooper v. Aaron.246 
There, the Court pronounced with great confidence that “the fed-
eral judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Consti-
tution.”247 A half-century since Cooper, the Supreme Court has, if 
anything, only become more supreme. Thus, it is now a “cardinal 
rule of constitutional law” that the Court is the “ultimate expositor 
of the constitutional text.”248 Or as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, 
“it falls to [the] Court, not Congress, to define the substance of 
constitutional guarantees.”249 Congress may not speak in constitu-
tional terms, we are told, or else “[s]hifting legislative majorities 
could change the Constitution.”250 In short, proponents of judicial 
supremacy hold that the Constitution is defined by the Court—and 
only the Court. 
The strongest case for judicial supremacy likely rests on the 
Court’s greatest successes. For example, judicial supremacy pro-
duced Brown v. Board of Education.251 When no one else would 
stand up for black schoolchildren, it was the Court—aided by its 
self-proclaimed interpretational supremacy—that came to the res-
cue. Or when a state attempted to outlaw pure political expression 
in the form of flag burning, it was the Court in Texas v. Johnson 
that stood on principle, striking down the statute despite enormous 
popular support for the law.252 Thus, the case for judicial supremacy 
self-consciously acknowledges, and even flaunts, its “counterma-
joritarian” nature. Judicial supremacy, being practiced by judges 
246 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
247 Id. at 18. 
248 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). 
249 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003). 
250 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). 
251 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
252 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
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insulated from “shifting legislative majorities,” protects core con-
stitutional values from passionate majorities. 
Protecting constitutional values is not judicial supremacy’s only 
justification. Another justification is more pragmatic: the judiciary 
must have the final word, it is argued, because final words are use-
ful. Justice Brandeis’ famous quip is particularly apt here: “in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be set-
tled than that it be settled right.”253 Professors Alexander and 
Schauer find significant value in the capacity of judicial review to 
“say [with finality] what the law is.”254 For them, a “central moral 
function of law is to settle what ought to be done,” and judicial su-
premacy accomplishes this goal more desirably than other alterna-
tives.255 Of course, it is fair to ask why the judiciary, rather than 
other constitutional actors, should be entitled to set the final word. 
That has been answered, however, by appeals to the judiciary’s in-
sulation from majoritarian pressures, its institutional practices, and 
its comparative expertise.256 
2. Popular Constitutionalism 
Popular constitutionalists believe essentially what President 
Abraham Lincoln believed on the day of his first inauguration in 
1861: “if the policy of the government upon vital questions, affect-
ing the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court, . . . the people will have ceased to be their own 
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government 
into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”257 If there is any funda-
mental principle in American government, it is a dedication to 
popular sovereignty. The United States belongs to the people, and 
the officials of the federal government serve at the people’s pleas-
ure and for their welfare. Thus, for a popular constitutionalist, “the 
253 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). 
254 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
255 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 12, at 457; see also Farber, supra note 12. 
256 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 12, at 476–77; Roosevelt, supra note 128, at 
1696–700 (arguing that courts are likely superior to non-judicial actors in interpreting 
text, though not necessarily superior in designing decision rules to implement the 
text). 
257 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in Abraham 
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 579, 585–86 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1976). 
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role of the people is not confined to occasional acts of constitution 
making, but includes active and ongoing control over the interpre-
tation and enforcement of constitutional law.”258 Popular constitu-
tionalists believe that the people should be involved in every act of 
constitution-making. 
Popular constitutionalists reserve their fiercest criticism for the 
Rehnquist Court’s “Section Five” decisions evaluating Congress’ 
power to legislate under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. City of Boerne v. Flores is a classic example.259 Prior to 1990, 
the Supreme Court invalidated facially neutral laws burdening the 
free exercise of religion if those laws were not supported by a com-
pelling government interest. Then, in 1990, the Court reversed 
course, holding that facially neutral laws raise no free exercise 
problems, regardless of the burden imposed on religious prac-
tices.260 Congress disliked this turn of events. In 1993, therefore, it 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the pur-
pose of which was to “restore the compelling interest test as set 
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all 
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”261    
In City of Boerne, decided four years later, the Supreme Court 
held the RFRA unconstitutional because Congress had attempted 
to “alter[] the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.”262 The Court 
explained it thus: 
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Four-
teenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitu-
tion be superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary 
means. It would be on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, 
like other acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to 
258 Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 959, 959 
(2004). 
259 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Other cases include United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
627 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act), United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act), and Kimel 
v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that Congress did not 
have the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act). 
260 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
261 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006). 
262 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
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alter it. Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a prin-
ciple that would limit congressional power.263 
On these grounds, City of Boerne is akin to Lochner v. New York, 
the now-mythic case in which the Supreme Court struck down so-
cial legislation supported by democratic majorities.264 
Thus, the case in favor of popular constitutionalism stands 
chiefly on its consonance with America’s deep commitment to de-
mocratic rule.265 It is the people’s Constitution after all, not the 
Court’s, and the people therefore ought to have a say in how their 
Constitution is applied. Though the judicial apparatus will always 
be necessary to implement actual decisions, the judiciary should 
nonetheless defer to the people in close cases. Such deference af-
firms “the quintessentially democratic attitude in which citizens 
know themselves as authorities, as authors of their own law.”266 
Moreover, by listening to the populace in setting constitutional 
meaning, the Court encourages a sort of democratic self-
actualization. Finding their voice relevant to constitutional ques-
tions, the public will explore and express their views, thus instigat-
ing further exploration and expression, all of which leads to a more 
informed populace and better self-government. As Dean Larry 
Kramer has explained, “Supreme Court decisions do not settle 
constitutional disputes so much as provide ammunition for their 
continuation.”267 This continuation, however, is valuable because it 
263 Id. at 529 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
264 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Profes-
sor Kramer, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1013, 1023 (2004) (drawing a parallel between Lochner 
and City of Boerne); Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 
Cath. Law. 25, 39–40 (2000) (“The most striking thing about the [Boerne] opinion is 
how the logic of Boerne parallels the logic of Lochner v. New York.”). 
265 To be sure, there are many varied strains of thought often placed under the um-
brella of “popular constitutionalism.” In presenting this brief summary of the school’s 
central views, I do not mean to suggest that numerous alternative views do not also 
exist. For a summary of several views, see James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without 
Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1377, 1378–80 (2005), and Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Con-
stitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 Geo. L.J. 
897, 906–11 (2005). 
266 Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 1983. 
267 Kramer, supra note 258, at 972. 
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“provides the inspiration for reshaping the Constitution so as to 
keep it fresh and current with society.”268 
3. Mediating Supremacy and Populism 
As described above, judicial supremacy and popular constitu-
tionalism are fundamentally irreconcilable. Supremacists insist on 
judicial insulation from popular will because judging is the business 
of law, not politics. Populists insist that the people have a part in 
constitutional interpretation because law exists to serve the people. 
There is no way to both include and exclude the people at the same 
time—except perhaps through enforcement by proxy. 
When a court enforces a constitutional norm through a sub-
constitutional law, the court is able to stand up for the Constitution 
and yet allow the electorate to have significant—but not total—
regulatory control over the issue in question. Core values that judi-
cial supremacy is thought to protect—chiefly, minority rights in the 
face of intolerant majorities—will not be sacrificed through en-
forcement by proxy because, as explained above, the practice is 
only permissible if the alternative law will maintain the constitu-
tional order.269 At the same time that constitutional order is being 
maintained, however, democratic preferences are also given effect 
because the law applied is a product of the legislature, not the 
courts. 
To be sure, federal courts might be able to mediate these ten-
sions without the proxy enforcement tool through the long-
standing “constitutional avoidance” doctrine, whereby courts de-
cide constitutional cases on non-constitutional grounds when pos-
sible.270 Although this doctrine does ameliorate tensions over inter-
268 Id. at 975. 
269 See supra Subsection II.A.1; Section II.B. 
270 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 224 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In rec-
ognition of our place in the constitutional scheme, we must act with ‘great gravity and 
delicacy’ when telling a coordinate branch that its actions are absolutely prohibited 
absent constitutional amendment.”) (citation omitted); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“It is not the habit of the 
court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a 
decision of the case.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Michael L. 
Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. Rev. 1539, 1548 
(2007) (noting that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is aimed at alleviating the 
“friction between democratic principles and judicial authority”). 
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pretive supremacy, it is invoked haphazardly and less often today 
than before.271 Even if the doctrine were invoked more often and 
more consistently, however, it could not, in the long run, stave off 
judicial supremacy as competently as proxy enforcement. As long 
as plaintiffs seek constitutional rulings from federal courts, courts 
will eventually be forced to rule on sensitive issues of constitutional 
law because complaints can be drafted in ways that avoid questions 
of sub-constitutional law.272 Thus, only proxy enforcement provides 
courts a way to avoid, consistently and autonomously, plowing up 
new constitutional ground. 
I do not contend that proxy enforcement will always be valuable 
in mediating tensions of interpretive supremacy. In fact, the medi-
ating value will only arise where there is, in fact, a substantive dif-
ference between constitutional law and the putative alternative. If, 
for example, a federal statute creates a right to be free from inten-
tional discrimination on the basis of race at the hands of govern-
ment officials273 and provides remedies equal to those available in a 
Section 1983 action, applying the statute instead of the Constitu-
tion will accomplish little because the democratic preferences (the 
statute) are perfectly aligned with judicial preferences (the case 
law). In this situation, there is no tension in need of mediation by 
the Court. 
In other cases, however, tensions will be high and the corre-
sponding value of proxy enforcement will be high as well in conse-
quence. If Congress is dissatisfied with the Court’s tiered scrutiny 
analysis in Equal Protection cases, it is free to create statutory 
rights of equal protection that would be more or less robust than 
the rights available under Court doctrine. Thus, Congress could 
grant homosexuals rights that the Court has denied them274 and re-
271 See generally Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 
N.C. L. Rev. 847 (2005). 
272 This is especially true in the most common types of constitutional tort cases, 
where the officer has not acted according to a specific statutory mandate, but instead 
has exceeded the scope of his authority. In those cases, state or federal statutory law 
will be irrelevant to the determination of whether the Constitution was violated. See, 
e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
273 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976). 
274 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–33 (1996) (holding that legislation dis-
criminating against homosexuals should be reviewed under a rational basis test). 
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tract from aliens some of the rights the Court has granted them.275 
Such statutes could likely stand in the place of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause without risking the constitutional order. Certainly, new 
rights for homosexuals do not put the constitutional order at risk, 
since they simply augment protections that (though minimal) are 
already in place. And a retraction of rights available to aliens need 
not risk the constitutional order as long as government is still com-
pelled to recognize aliens’ status as “persons” entitled to protec-
tions under the major provisions of the Bill of Rights.276 While this 
may be undesirable from a policy perspective, it is not constitu-
tionally objectionable unless one can say that strict scrutiny in 
alienage cases is constitutionally required—a position that is quite 
difficult to take considering the text of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Inasmuch as enforcement by proxy gives effect to the choices of 
non-Article III actors, it encourages those actors to take an in-
creasingly greater role in propounding their own solutions to vari-
ous regulatory problems. That is, inasmuch as judicial supremacy 
breeds legislative apathy, enforcement by proxy should encourage 
legislative activism. The supremacy evidenced in City of Boerne il-
lustrates this. With the RFRA, Congress did not, as the Court 
claimed, attempt to “alter[] the meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause”; it simply sought to create statutory rights protecting the 
exercise of religion.277 Had the Court been open to the possibility of 
proxy enforcement, it would have concluded quite readily that the 
RFRA could stand in the shoes of the Free Exercise Clause. As it 
275 See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 850 (7th ed. 2004) 
(“All of the Court’s decisions since 1970 [regarding discrimination against aliens] 
would appear to be consistent if the Court were using an intermediate standard of re-
view.”). 
276 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368–69 (1886) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to all “persons” regardless of citizenship). 
277 To be sure, this mistake was somewhat understandable, since Congress made 
clear that the RFRA was a response to a prior constitutional holding by the Court. 
See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v Flores and Con-
gressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31, 41 (“Perhaps the 
Court overlooked this point because Congress’s action, in establishing a statutory 
right, was expressly predicated on Congress’s disagreement with the Court’s interpre-
tation of the Constitution—as the reference to ‘Restoration’ in the Act’s title sug-
gests.”). 
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was, however, the Court chided Congress, and Congress was left to 
believe that it had no regulatory authority to protect free speech. 
B. Sharing the Constitution with the States 
Although judicial supremacy over Congress is highly contested, 
supremacy over the states is well established and widely accepted. 
Justice Holmes once compared the two types of judicial supremacy 
this way: “I do not think the United States would come to an end if 
we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think 
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declara-
tion as to the laws of the several States.”278 
Thus, where state law is implicated in a proxy enforcement case, 
there is no tension over supremacy needing amelioration. Yet, 
there are still compelling reasons why the federal courts, though 
clearly possessed of supreme power, might decline to exercise it 
over the states. By applying state law to enforce the Constitution, 
federal courts provide states with the regulatory space to develop 
their own solutions to persistent constitutional problems. The na-
tion benefits when sub-national sovereigns are able to experiment 
with innovative solutions while not simultaneously endangering the 
whole nation.279 
Smith v. Robbins, discussed above, is a good example of this 
principle in action.280 Years before Smith, the Supreme Court held 
in Anders v. California that the U.S. Constitution requires publicly 
appointed criminal defense attorneys to follow strict rules in de-
clining to file an appeal on grounds of frivolity.281 In Smith, the 
Court considered California procedures for attorney withdrawal 
that departed from these rules. The Court did not disapprove of 
278 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in Collected Legal Papers 291, 295–
96 (1920). 
279 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317, 397 (1997) (“In-
tuition suggests that with fifty different parallel state governments, and countless sub-
state governments as well, innovations in governing or problem solving will occur that 
will inure to the benefit of the entire populace in the long run.”); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1498 
(1987) (book review) (“Elementary statistical theory holds that a greater number of 
independent observations will produce more instances of deviation from the mean. If 
innovation is desirable, it follows that decentralization is desirable.”). 
280 528 U.S. 259 (2000). 
281 386 U.S. 738, 744–45 (1967). 
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the procedure simply because it varied from the Anders procedure. 
Rather, it held that “the Anders procedure is merely one method 
of satisfying the requirements of the Constitution for indigent 
criminal appeals.”282 Although Smith was not a classic proxy en-
forcement case (it was a habeas petition), the illustration is apt. 
When a federal court applies a state constitutional or statutory 
provision in place of a federal constitutional rule, the same type of 
innovation that California attempted in Smith will be respected and 
encouraged. If state law is constantly ignored in civil rights actions, 
states will naturally become less interested in regulating the state-
citizen relationship. 
C. Developing the Constitution 
The civil rights action, inasmuch as it invites courts to espouse 
constitutional meaning, can be a tool of constitutional develop-
ment. Development, in this sense, is simply the process of constitu-
tional elaboration.283 The Constitution “deals in general language” 
and thus demands elaboration.284 As Owen Fiss has put it, 
[t]he values that we find in our Constitution—liberty, equality, 
due process, freedom of speech, no establishment of religion, 
property, no impairments of the obligation of contract, security 
of the person, no cruel and unusual punishment—are ambigu-
ous. They are capable of a great number of different meanings. 
They often conflict. There is a need—a constitutional need—to 
282 Smith, 528 U.S. at 276. 
283 Some see constitutional “development” as the expansion of individual rights. See 
John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional 
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403, 405 (1999) (ar-
guing that constitutional rights are expanded when courts hear larger numbers of con-
stitutional cases). I do not offer it in this sense, however, there is little evidence that 
adjudicating civil rights damages actions will actually expand rights. See Healy, supra 
note 271, at 930 (raising “serious questions about the extent to which the Court’s de-
parture from the avoidance principle actually promotes the evolution of constitutional 
rights”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale 
L.J. 87, 89–90 (1999) (arguing that constitutional damages actions may impede the ex-
pansion of individual liberties); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Ex-
periment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 667, 670 (2009) (presenting em-
pirical evidence that the practice of constitutional avoidance “leads to the articulation 
of more constitutional law, but not the expansion of constitutional rights”). 
284 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816). 
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give them specific meaning, to give them operational content, 
and, where there is a conflict, to set priorities.285 
The need for elaboration is, in many respects, simply a different 
gloss on the need for implementation discussed in Part II.286 What-
ever the nature of their kinship, the process of constitutional elabo-
ration might seem to be threatened by constitutional enforcement 
by proxy. Proxy enforcement addresses the state-citizen relation-
ship without particularizing constitutional meaning. This raises the 
fear that the Constitution will play a diminished role in our lives, 
atrophying from lack of use.287 
For the most part, this fear is misplaced. It is no doubt true that 
constitutional enforcement through common law or statutory ac-
tions will decrease the number of constitutional expositions. It is 
incorrect, however, to assume that constitutional development will 
therefore suffer. As an initial matter, when a court engages in 
proxy enforcement, it must at least determine that the alternative 
law is sufficient to the task of preserving constitutional norms. 
Thus, when the Supreme Court, in Smith v. Robbins, held that a 
state rule of procedure could replace the Anders method of attor-
ney withdrawal in criminal cases, the Court by necessity deter-
mined whether the state rule adequately protected the defendant’s 
right to an attorney.288 As the Court put it there: 
285 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 
93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1979); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 447, 489–94 (1994) (arguing that the Founders intended that federal 
courts exercise an “expository function” in Article III “cases” but not “controver-
sies”). 
286 Richard Fallon’s theory of constitutional implementation thus recognizes the role 
of constitutional elaboration. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1800 (“[T]here exists 
a substantial body of case law, rising almost to the level of a general tradition, in 
which adjudication, and constitutional adjudication in particular, functions more as a 
vehicle for the pronouncement of norms than for the resolution of particular dis-
putes.”). 
287 Greabe, supra note 283, at 405 (“[T]he corpus of constitutional law grows only 
when courts address and resolve novel constitutional claims, but courts often cannot 
order a remedy for such claims because of their novelty.”); id. at 410 (“The require-
ment that the allegedly violated right be clearly established at the time of the action in 
question tends, if not to ‘freeze’ constitutional law, then at least to retard its 
growth . . . .”). 
288 528 U.S. 259 (2000). 
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Having determined that [the state withdrawal] procedure is not 
unconstitutional merely because it diverges from the [constitu-
tionally required] Anders procedure, we turn to consider 
the . . . procedure on its own merits. We think it clear that [the 
state] system does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, for 
it provides “a criminal appellant pursuing a first appeal as of 
right [the] minimum safeguards necessary to make that appeal 
‘adequate and effective.’”289 
Thus, even in cases of proxy enforcement, the Constitution will not 
be left out of the discussion. It will continue to be discussed and its 
minimum requirements will continue to be elaborated. 
Even if proxy enforcement does limit constitutional elaboration 
to some degree, it is unlikely that much harm will flow from that 
limitation. The appropriate inquiry here is not simply whether the 
instances of elaboration will decrease, but instead whether the re-
maining instances of elaboration are sufficient to accomplish the 
goal of constitutional development.290 There can be little doubt that 
the federal courts will still retain numerous opportunities to ad-
dress the great majority of constitutional rights in cases involving 
them.  These opportunities include (1) defenses in criminal and 
civil actions, (2) motions to exclude evidence in criminal actions, 
(3) assertion of trial-based rights during trial, (4) petitions for a 
writ of habeas corpus, and (5) cases where proxy enforcement is 
impermissible. 
Defenses. Where one is sued for committing a wrong, one way to 
escape liability is to claim that the law underlying the prosecution 
violates the Constitution. Thus, a person subject to criminal prose-
cution for burning his draft card can claim that his conduct was free 
expression protected by the First Amendment.291 Or a defendant 
facing loitering charges can assert that the law used to prosecute 
289 Id. at 276 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
290 This much is evidenced by the widespread support for principles of constitutional 
avoidance, particularly the last resort rule, though it clearly decreases the instances of 
constitutional adjudication. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Healy, supra note 271 (criticizing the “rise of unnec-
essary constitutional rulings”). But see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional 
Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003, 1035–65 (1994) (supporting the last resort rule in 
cases of judicial review of congressional or executive action, but criticizing the rule’s 
use in all other cases). 
291 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
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him was unconstitutionally vague.292 Or a homosexual can assert a 
substantive due process defense if prosecuted for homosexual 
acts.293 Or a defendant charged with the use of marijuana can argue 
that the federal government has no authority to regulate home-
grown marijuana.294 Civil defendants can also make use of constitu-
tional defenses, such as in defamation cases,295 cases where personal 
jurisdiction is lacking,296 or cases where the defendant is a govern-
ment actor.297 
Motions to Exclude. In state or federal criminal trials, the gov-
ernment may not prosecute a defendant using evidence obtained as 
the result of a constitutional violation.298 Where a defendant be-
lieves that illegally obtained evidence may be offered against him, 
he will normally move the court to exclude such evidence. In these 
instances, courts must determine whether the defendant’s constitu-
tional rights were in fact violated. It should go without saying that 
such “exclusionary rule” issues arise incredibly frequently in crimi-
nal prosecutions, typically implicating Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth 
Amendment rights.299 Admittedly, not all constitutional violations 
292 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
293 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
294 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
295 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964). 
296 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
297 When a law or practice of a government is challenged civilly, the government will 
often defend itself by arguing that it had the authority to behave as it did. Thus, the 
court must evaluate the contours of government authority, often a constitutional 
question. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that 
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to 
Commerce Clause); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) 
(holding that the federal government has power under the Commerce Clause to apply 
minimum wage requirements on state and local governments). Even in police abuse 
cases brought under tort law rather than the Fourth Amendment, the contours of the 
Fourth Amendment will often be discussed, since the Amendment defines the limits 
of police authority. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Why Bivens Won’t Die: The Legacy of 
Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 83 Denv. U. L. Rev. 685, 709–15 (2006) (noting 
that state-law tort actions against government agents will often involve the same con-
stitutional claims as those in civil rights actions, except the issues will arise as defenses 
rather than as part of the plaintiff’s affirmative case). 
298 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to state crimi-
nal cases); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (applying the exclusionary 
rule to federal criminal cases). 
299 Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 
Fordham L. Rev. 1913, 1915–16 (2007) (explaining that criminal defendants “often 
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merit exclusion, such as “knock-and-announce”300 and certain 
Miranda violations.301 And other rights, though generally covered 
by the rule, may not be vindicated by the rule if any of several ex-
ceptions apply.302 Nonetheless, it is still likely that a large number 
and a wide variety of constitutional rights will be addressed in mo-
tions to exclude. 
Trial-Based Rights. Some constitutional rights apply only at trial. 
For example, the right to a trial by jury303 and the right to confront 
adverse witnesses304 are issues that will only arise during trial or liti-
gation more generally. These issues will no doubt present them-
selves to federal courts quite often, regardless of a decrease in civil 
rights actions. 
Petitions for Habeas Corpus. A state or federal prisoner may 
challenge the lawfulness of his detention in federal court by peti-
tioning for a writ of habeas corpus.305 Petitions that demonstrate a 
constitutional violation connected to the arrest, prosecution, or 
conviction of the defendant will merit a new trial, or else the de-
fendant will be freed.306 It is true, however, that some constitutional 
violations are not cognizable in habeas. Fourth Amendment viola-
tions committed during the defendant’s arrest, even if grounds for 
assert constitutional claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments” as a de-
fense because those claims are “relatively costless” to assert and “may be the only 
way of avoiding a criminal conviction and the disastrous consequences that follow”). 
300 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that violation of the 
“knock-and-announce” rule does not require suppression of evidence found in a 
search). 
301 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642–44 (2004) (holding that failure to give 
Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the nontestimonial fruit of a sus-
pect’s voluntary statements). 
302 For example, if the constitutional violation occurred in “good faith,” the evidence 
obtained will not be excluded. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–26 (1984). 
Similarly, if the evidence obtained was sufficiently attenuated from the violation, 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963), was obtained from an inde-
pendent source, Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537–38 (1988), or would have 
been inevitably discovered during a lawful investigation, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431, 442–44 (1984), the evidence is admissible. Finally, evidence will not be excluded 
if it is offered in a non-criminal proceeding, such as a parole board hearing. Pa. Bd. of 
Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 359 (1998). 
303 Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 573–74 
(1990). 
304 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
305 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–2255 (2006). 
306 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463–65 (1953). 
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excluding inculpatory evidence at trial, will not be considered on 
habeas.307 More relevant to the elaboration concern, habeas peti-
tioners may not typically take advantage of, or attempt to establish, 
new rules of constitutional law.308 While this limits the role of ha-
beas actions in constitutional elaboration, there can be little doubt 
that habeas actions still provide a significant opportunity for the ar-
ticulation of current law.309 
Cases in Which Proxy Enforcement Is Impermissible. In Part II, I 
explained that courts may enforce the Constitution by proxy only 
where (1) Congress has not prohibited the practice, and (2) the al-
ternative law will be sufficient to maintain the constitutional or-
der.310 Thus, there will be many instances where proxy enforcement 
is impermissible and constitutional elaboration will therefore oc-
cur. Section II.C noted that tort law will rarely, if ever, displace the 
Constitution in Section 1983 suits, which means that the Constitu-
tion will be adjudicated anytime a federal statute does not prohibit 
a Section 1983 suit or is inadequate to the task of maintaining con-
stitutional order. There are a great many areas of government ac-
tion addressed by constitutional rules, but unaddressed by federal 
statutes, such as police practices covered by the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. This means that there will still 
likely be considerable adjudication of constitutional questions in 
these and other similarly qualified areas. 
In sum, these five different instances of adjudication will likely 
provide federal courts with significant—and most important, suffi-
cient—opportunities for constitutional elaboration. It is thus diffi-
cult to argue that significant areas of constitutional law will decay 
into a state of desuetude if certain civil rights actions are handled 
through alternative legal regimes. 
307 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976). 
308 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310–11 (1989) (holding that new rules do not apply 
in habeas cases unless the rule declares lawful the behavior for which the defendant 
was convicted or is a “watershed” rule of constitutional law—a rarely declared rule of 
constitutional law comparable to Miranda or Gideon). 
309 For example, the rights to effective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984), and access to exculpatory evidence, see Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), have been helpfully articulated in countless habeas 
actions, even though the petitions attempted to invoke “new law.” 
310 See supra Section II.C. 
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D. Debating the Constitution 
According to some, civil rights actions not only provide the op-
portunity to develop the meaning of the Constitution, but also pro-
vide an opportunity for us to debate the core values that bind us to-
gether as a nation. Debate is good, the theory goes, because it leads 
to informed decisionmaking and, ultimately, change. Brown v. 
Board of Education was good for America because it increased the 
debate over racial equality,311 and Roe v. Wade was good because it 
spurred debate—even “rage” perhaps—over women’s autonomy.312 
If constitutional adjudication is to be limited by proxy enforce-
ment, there arises the fear that our national debate, and therefore 
our public policy choices, will suffer as well. 
This argument is disproved in two principal ways. First, as ex-
plained just above in Section IV.C, constitutional litigation, and 
thus debate, will not be stymied by proxy enforcement. The proc-
ess of determining whether proxy enforcement is permissible will 
involve questions of constitutional law, and even where proxy en-
forcement is chosen, numerous adjudicative opportunities to de-
bate the Constitution will still remain. 
Second, those who favor the value of constitutional debate often 
place too much emphasis on constitutional litigation. Professors 
Schauer and Alexander have called this “the conceit of American 
constitutionalism”—that is, the belief “that Americans need the 
Constitution in order to debate affirmative action, criminal justice, 
abortion, religion and state, privacy, or capital punishment.”313 
Moreover, even if America depends on litigation to focus its atten-
tion on a particular issue, there is no reason to think that statutory 
311 See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and 
the Struggle for Racial Equality 421–42 (2004) (arguing that Brown instigated racial 
change by antagonizing Southern segregationists who reacted in often violent fashion, 
therefore eliciting widespread support for comprehensive civil rights legislation). 
312 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Back-
lash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 374 (2007) (using the backlash caused by Roe to 
argue that “interpretive disagreement [is] a normal condition for the development of 
constitutional law”). 
313 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 12, at 468 (“[I]t appears to us far from certain 
that a constitution is either a necessary or a sufficient condition, or even a significant 
causal contributor, to fruitful public debate about matters of great political and moral 
moment.”). 
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litigation cannot fulfill this role.314 Indeed, many federal statutes are 
so far-reaching and comprehensive that they can be seen, accord-
ing to Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn, as an “intermediate cate-
gory of fundamental or quasi-constitutional law.”315 Federal statutes 
outlawing racial discrimination, for example, reach much further 
into our personal lives, and in doing so, demand greater attention 
than the Court’s entire body of Equal Protection jurisprudence.316 
So too do many other statutes.317 Thus, although constitutional liti-
gation may decline to some degree, there is little reason to believe 
that the overall level of public debate will diminish. 
E. Administrative Efficiency 
I have argued thus far that enforcement by proxy is permissible 
where Congress has explicitly or implicitly approved the practice 
and where the alternative law would uphold constitutional norms. I 
have also argued that, among those circumstances, proxy enforce-
ment will be desirable where interpretational tension exists or 
where state innovation is valued. What I have not yet considered, 
however, is whether proxy enforcement is even practical. Below, I 
explain that proxy enforcement is likely to impose an onerous bur-
den on courts where state law is the putative proxy, a burden that 
outweighs any benefit provided by state innovation. With respect 
to federal law, however, the costs of the practice will be much 
lower, thus making it desirable on the whole. 
314 Young, supra note 13, at 424 (“[M]any rights that are fundamental for individuals 
in modern America are entirely creatures of statute.”). Justice Scalia expressed a 
similar point in his dissent in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 619 (1988), arguing that it 
is foolish to assume that “every constitutional claim is ipso facto more worthy, and 
every statutory claim less worthy, of judicial review.” 
315 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 13, at 1275; id. at 1237 (“[T]he Civil Rights Act 
[of 1964] is a proven super-statute because it embodies a great principle (antidiscrimi-
nation), was adopted after an intense political struggle and normative debate and has 
over the years entrenched its norm into American public life, and has pervasively af-
fected federal statutes and constitutional law.”). 
316 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit.7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. (2006). 
317 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621. 
(2006); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971. (2006); Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2006). 
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1. State Law as Proxy 
Proxy enforcement is likely to prove quite difficult in cases 
where the alternative law is state law for two main reasons: (1) the 
ambiguous nature of tort law where constitutional rights are con-
cerned, and (2) the number of sub-national lawmaking bodies. 
Among various types of state law that might be invoked in a proxy 
situation, tort law is the most common.318 Tort law focuses chiefly 
on the interactions between private persons; it instructs persons 
how to behave with each other, and imposes liability when people 
fail to adhere to its edicts. Constitutional law is different. Its pri-
mary focus is on the behavior of the government.319 It instructs gov-
ernment officers how to behave, whether they are enacting legisla-
tion or policing the streets. In some instances, it will be clear that 
tort and constitutional law will both apply. Thus, where an officer, 
having no justification, hits a pedestrian over the head with a night-
stick, the officer has violated both tort and constitutional law. Simi-
larly, it will also be clear sometimes that tort law will not apply. 
Thus, where a government official denies food stamps to an indi-
vidual because of her race, tort law will not be available for relief. 
If these instances were representative of the whole, courts could 
coherently implement a proxy enforcement system. That is, courts 
could determine whether tort law would, or would not, deter un-
constitutional behavior to the degree necessary to maintain the 
constitutional order. But, a court cannot make this determination 
unless it is able to ascertain the content of tort law. Yet, tort law 
and constitutional law often vary in subtle ways, making it difficult 
to know in advance whether tort law will actually apply to uncon-
318 See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
319 Commentators have noted the problems caused by applying tort concepts to con-
stitutional claims. See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from 
Constitution to Tort, 77 Geo. L.J. 1719, 1738–50 (1989) (addressing the deleterious 
“implications of tort rhetoric”); Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 
Rutgers L.J. 715, 758 (2006) (“Using tort law to remedy torture [by the U.S. govern-
ment] is like using nuisance law to handle the generation and disposal of hazardous 
wastes. In each situation, the problem is simply much bigger and badder than the 
problems for which the law was designed.”); Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing 
the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 661, 686 (1997) (“It is 
dangerous to define constitutional claims as a narrow subset of tort law because tort 
law has been particularly ineffective in dealing with precisely the sorts of interests and 
injuries that are at the center of constitutional law.”). 
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stitutional conduct. It will often be unclear, for example, whether 
using thermal imaging to search a house will be an intrusion upon 
seclusion under state tort law,320 or whether denying a prisoner ac-
cess to a toilet in violation of the Eighth Amendment will violate 
an innkeeper law,321 or whether an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk 
will be a battery.322 
Though problematic, this ambiguity in tort law, taken alone, is 
not enough to make proxy enforcement unwise. If it were, proxy 
enforcement based on federal statutes might also be problematic, 
since such statutes may often be ambiguous with respect to their 
regulation of unconstitutional behavior. Moreover, a court could 
adopt a proxy enforcement system and simply disregard all tort law 
that did not clearly provide deterrent force. Such a “clear state-
ment rule” might curtail the number of instances in which proxy 
enforcement was used, but it would keep the practice alive and 
available. 
Yet even this accommodation to the ambiguity inherent in tort 
law is likely to be more effort than federal courts are capable of 
expending. This owes to the large number of sub-national govern-
320 For example, the intent of the intruder will often have a role in intrusion upon 
seclusion claims but be irrelevant to Fourth Amendment claims. Compare Plaxico v. 
Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1039–40 (Miss. 1999) (refusing to impose liability on ex-
husband who, concerned about the “welfare of his daughter,” secretly took photos of 
ex-wife’s lesbian partner in state of undress), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
353 (1967) (disregarding officer’s intent in finding a wiretap in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment). See also Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 
1998) (“We agree . . . that all the circumstances of an intrusion, including the motives 
or justification of the intruder, are pertinent to the offensiveness element [of intrusion 
upon seclusion].”); Linda Ross Meyer, Unruly Rights, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 35 (2000) 
(“The case law is clear that the offensiveness of the invasion . . . turns on the reasons 
and intentions of the invader.”). 
321 Innkeeper laws require prisons to protect inmates “against unreasonable risk of 
physical harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(1)(a), (2) (1965). While a 
beating in violation of the Eight Amendment will likely violate this duty, it is any-
body’s guess whether depriving an inmate of adequate nutrition, also an Eighth 
Amendment violation, will violate the common law duty as well. See Hutto v. Finney, 
437 U.S. 678 (1978) (holding that prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to ade-
quate nutrition). 
322 Under many state laws, liability for an “offensive touching” requires proof that 
the defendant intended the touching and intended it to be offensive. See Dobbs, supra 
note 220, at 58–59 n.4 (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13). It will often be 
difficult to tell whether an officer, mistakenly believing he has reasonable suspicion to 
stop and frisk a person, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968), nonetheless in-
tended to offend that person. 
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ments empowered to make law. In our federal system, the U.S. 
government enjoys relatively limited lawmaking authority. In con-
trast, sub-national governments—including state governments, 
counties, and municipalities—enjoy a great deal of authority. A po-
lice officer in a particular city is therefore obligated to obey not 
just the Fourth Amendment, but also any state constitutional pro-
visions, state statutes, and county or municipal laws. A federal 
court that has adopted a proxy enforcement practice—even one 
that requires the alternative law to clearly provide relief—must 
therefore sort through a large number of state and local laws to de-
termine whether any of them will provide relief. Moreover, once a 
court makes that determination, the decision will have little or no 
precedential effect outside that particular locality. Thus, federal 
courts would not be able to develop a single system of proxy en-
forcement, or even fifty different systems of proxy enforcement, 
but instead would be forced to develop several hundred such sys-
tems. Proxy enforcement based on state law would work one way 
in Los Angeles County, California; a different way in Cody, Wyo-
ming; and still a different way in Yuma, Arizona, even though the 
localities are all part of the Ninth Circuit. Innovation at the local 
level has value, but this value is overcome when the avenues of 
constitutional enforcement hinge on the shifting policies of Gar-
field County, Montana (population 1,215).323 
Thus, the costs of proxy enforcement using state law are likely to 
be too onerous to justify their use. It will be difficult to ascertain 
the meaning of tort law in numerous instances and, even if the law 
were clear, it would prove difficult to monitor the changes in local 
law that will inevitably occur over time. 
2. Federal Law as Proxy 
The difficulties arising from using state law as a constitutional 
proxy are much less pronounced with regard to federal statutes or 
regulations. While these laws can be ambiguous, they emanate 
from a much smaller set of sources—that is, Congress or adminis-
trative agencies. This is not to say that the overall number of appli-
323 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, http://www.census.gov/popest/ 
counties/CO-EST2007-01.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2009) (providing population es-
timates for counties as of July 1, 2007). 
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cable laws will be small (though they will be far less numerous than 
all state laws), just that the laws will apply uniformly throughout 
the nation. Thus, the role of Title IX in peer-on-peer Equal Protec-
tion claims can be completely resolved with one case.324 Such reso-
lution could never be accomplished where state law was concerned. 
It is true that proxy enforcement will increase the work of the 
federal courts to some degree. Under a direct enforcement scheme, 
federal courts would just adjudicate the claim instead of determin-
ing, in the first instance, whether the claim could be enforced with 
sub-constitutional law. This increased work, however, will yield 
significant benefits in mediating supremacy and populism interests. 
Moreover, the burden should decrease over time as precedent dic-
tates which laws may, or may not, permissibly stand in for the Con-
stitution. As noted above, this issue has been resolved for the fore-
seeable future in the Title IX context; it need not be re-litigated at 
all unless Congress initiates a change in the law. Should Congress 
do so, a judicial reassessment of the proxy enforcement, while 
marginally increasing judicial workloads, nonetheless would offer 
Congress a seat at the constitutional table, something it would oth-
erwise lack. 
F. Illustrations 
In Section III.D, I reviewed a variety of cases in which the prac-
tice of proxy enforcement might apply and identified the cases in 
which it was permissible. Those cases included Correctional Ser-
vices Corp. v. Malesko, Carlson v. Green, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
and Johnson v. Bibb County. Based on the normative considera-
tions addressed in this Part, it is thus possible to conclude that fed-
eral courts should enforce the Constitution directly in Malesko and 
Carlson and enforce it by proxy in Chilicky and Johnson.325 
Malesko and Carlson both involved state tort law. As such, prac-
ticing proxy enforcement in those cases would embroil federal 
courts in the ongoing assessment of state law, which is bound to 
change over time and between different jurisdictions. One might 
dispute this conclusion by arguing that Carlson actually involved 
federal law—specifically the Federal Tort Claims Act. While it is 
324 See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009). 
325 See supra Section III.D. 
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true that the FTCA was potentially applicable in Carlson, the “fed-
eral” nature of the FTCA should not obscure the fact that enforc-
ing the Constitution by proxy in such cases would require the fed-
eral courts to delve deeply into state law. The FTCA does not 
contain any tort law of its own, but simply adopts the tort law of 
the state in which the lawsuit is brought.326 Thus, in the curious in-
stance where federal law essentially replicates state law, proxy en-
forcement is inappropriate for all of the reasons it would be inap-
propriate to apply state law on its own. 
Chilicky and Johnson, however, are ripe for proxy enforcement. 
They both involve a federal regulatory scheme that protects the 
same rights at stake had the cases been brought under the Consti-
tution. Further, approving proxy enforcement in these cases is a 
ruling that can apply nationwide without necessarily impinging on 
constitutional development or debate regarding public benefits or 
employment matters. These cases also illustrate the significance of 
Congress’ power to articulate the contours of constitutional en-
forcement without, at the same time, depriving the judiciary of its 
structural role. It is a power that could lawfully reach any number 
of different constitutional norms currently exclusively maintained 
by the federal courts. Most important, it is a power supported by 
democratic legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution deserves our honor, whether it be in the course 
of a trip to Washington, D.C., or a civil rights action. But in honor-
ing the Constitution, it is important to discern exactly what we are 
honoring. There is nothing wrong with honoring the First Amend-
ment, for example, through a civil rights action upholding the right 
to free expression. But when a court honors free expression 
through a federal statute, it does not dishonor the First Amend-
ment. Instead, it honors a principle that lies at the very heart of the 
Constitution—democratic rule. A court can honor the Constitution 
in more than one way, and proxy enforcement holds great promise 
326 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006) (imposing liability on the United States “under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claim-
ant in accordance with the law of the place where the [negligent or wrongful] act or 
omission occurred”). 
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as a way to honor the popular roots of our Constitution without 
neglecting the protection of individual rights for which it has be-
come revered. 
